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BHOPAL IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: 





Over thirty-five years ago, the city of Bhopal, India, witnessed 
a horrific gas leak that originated from a facility operated by 
Union Carbide India Limited (“UCIL”), which had as its parent 
company the American-based Union Carbide Corporation 
(“UCC”). Thousands were killed, with many more injured. One 
hundred forty-five cases were filed throughout various U.S. 
federal district courts on behalf of the victims asserting that 
UCIL and UCC were liable. Eventually, these cases were 
consolidated through the multi-district litigation (“MDL”) 
process and placed onto the docket of federal Judge John Keenan. 
In 1986, Judge Keenan issued his famous forum non conveniens 
opinion, which stated that the Indian courts—and not the U.S. 
federal judiciary—were the proper venue for hearing these 
claims. 
Between 1986 and 1993, Judge Keenan dismissed all of the 
other MDL Bhopal cases he heard. Then, between 2000 and 2014 
a set of distinct, non-MDL Bhopal matters appeared in front of 
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Judge Keenan. In all of these too, he issued dismissals. Indeed, 
the original MDL process—coupled with the existence of internal 
federal courthouse rules—created a type of path dependence, 
allowing for all of the Bhopal-Union Carbide matters to come 
before Judge Keenan. 
The thesis here is that following the MDL consolidation, Judge 
Keenan became only more deeply wedded to the position he 
staked out back in 1986. Subsequent, non-MDL Bhopal 
plaintiffs, seeking an independent assessment of their claims, 
found themselves tethered to the initial MDL decision from years 
past. The broader lesson—beyond just this case study—is that in 
order for deserving plaintiffs to receive a fresh review in federal 
court, there needs to be an alternative imagination for how to 
deal with later cases that, although seemingly connected, are 
nevertheless distinct from the earlier MDL process. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The year 2019 marked thirty-five years since the world witnessed 
what was then deemed to be the most devastating toxic tort disaster ever 
seen. In December of 1984, the city of Bhopal, located in the central 
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region of India, saw an Indian subsidiary owned by the American parent 
company, Union Carbide, leak some thirty-two tons of methyl isocyanate 
gasses that were supposed to be used for the production of insecticides.1 
The gasses proceeded to spread steadily across the city.2 The cold winter 
weather conditions trapped the fumes and suffocated large swaths of the 
population, inevitably increasing the injuries and death toll to horrifying 
levels.3 Although even to this day there remains no consensus on the 
exact number of people that were killed––the figures run from 
approximately 5,200 to 15,000 to 25,000––the damage of the Union 
Carbide gas leak can be still felt.4 Of those who survived, estimates are 
that over a half million residents were exposed to the gasses and continue 
to live with various types of injuries as a consequence.5 
The legal events following the Bhopal disaster have been well-
documented over the past three decades.6 Almost immediately, lawyers 
from around India and abroad—namely the United States7—descended 
 
 1. See e.g., Neeraj Santoshi, Bhopal Disaster: So, How Many Died? 32 Years On, No 
One Sure, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Dec. 3, 2016, 10:30 IST), https://www.hindustantimes.com/
bhopal/bhopal-disaster-so-how-many-died-32-years-on-no-one-sure/story-luLN0QaTxHlu0 
5RTGNHOoI.html. Also, in 2016, the University of Wisconsin-Madison established one of 
the foremost digital archives on the Bhopal tragedy. Bhopal: Law, Accidents, and Disaster 
in India, UNIV. WIS.: L. SCH. DIGITAL REPOSITORY, https://repository.law.wisc.edu/s/uwlaw/
page/bhopal-collection. Compiling over 3600 sources (much of which was donated by 
Professor Marc Galanter), this website provides links and files that have documented the 
Bhopal tragedy. Id. It contains over 3600 sources, including books, articles, newspapers, 
other journalistic accounts, government reports, amici curiae, cases, and much more. Id. 
 2. Lisa Moscati Hawkes, Parens Patriae and the Union Carbide Case: The Disaster at 
Bhopal Continues, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 181, 181 (1988). 
 3. See Apoorva Mandivilli, The World’s Worst Industrial Disaster Is Still Unfolding, 
ATLANTIC (July 10, 2018) https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/07/the-worlds-
worst-industrial-disaster-is-still-unfolding/560726/. 
 4. See Santoshi, supra note 1. 
 5. See e.g., Prabhash K. Dutta, Bhopal Gas Tragedy: What Happened this Day 33 
Years Ago that Killed Thousands?, INDIA TODAY (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.indiatoday.in/
india/story/bhopal-gas-tragedy-what-had-happened-this-day-33-years-ago-that-killed-thou 
sands-1099247-2017-12-03. 
 6. For a range of important studies, see e.g., UPENDRA BAXI & AMITA DHANDA, 
VALIANT VICTIMS AND LETHAL LITIGATION: THE BHOPAL CASE (1990); UPENDRA BAXI & 
THOMAS PAUL, MASS DISASTERS AND MULTINATIONAL LIABILITY: THE BHOPAL CASE (1986); 
JAMIE CASSELS, THE UNCERTAIN PROMISE OF LAW: LESSONS FROM BHOPAL (1993); KIM 
FORTUN, ADVOCACY AFTER BHOPAL: ENVIRONMENTALISM, DISASTER, AND NEW GLOBAL 
ORDERS (2001); Armin Rosencranz et al., Legal and Political Repercussions in India, in 
LEARNING FROM DISASTER: RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER BHOPAL 45–62 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 
1994); Upendra Baxi, Some Newly Emergent Geographies of Injustice: Boundaries and 
Borders in International Law, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 15, 23–27 (2016); Marc 
Galanter, Bhopal: 30 Years On, UNIV. WIS.: L. SCH. DIGITAL REPOSITORY (Oct. 16, 2014), 
https://repository.law.wisc.edu/s/uwlaw/page/bhopal-2014; see also Bhopal: Law, Accidents, 
and Disaster in India, supra note 1. 
 7. See Hawkes, supra note 2, at 181. 
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upon Bhopal to see what services they could provide. A key issue upon 
which they focused was whom to hold primarily liable: the Indian 
subsidiary or the American parent company, Union Carbide.8 Questions 
also arose as to what role the Indian government ought to play.9 And of 
course, most importantly, there was the issue of how best to provide 
remedies to the victims and their families.10 
In the weeks that followed, intensive discussions occurred among 
Indian government leaders and Indian and American plaintiffs’ lawyers. 
These talks centered on whether a lawsuit on behalf of the victims should 
be brought in India or in the United States.11 Ultimately, the decision 
was made that because the Indian courts suffered from tremendous 
backlogs as well as the fact that Indian law did not offer adequate mass 
tort remedies, the American lawyers representing the Bhopal victims 
would sue the parent company in the United States.12 Thereafter, “some 
145 purported class actions [were] filed in federal district courts across 
the United States.”13 
On January 2, 1985––exactly one month after the gas leak occurred—
the American Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (“JPML”) 
transferred these class actions to the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York (“SDNY”), where they then “became the subject of a 
consolidated complaint filed on June 28, 1985, before Judge John 
Keenan.”14 Statutorily created in 1968, the JPML emerged as part of 
Congress’ multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) program, which was 
empowered to combine “civil actions involving one or more common 
questions of fact . . . pending in different districts, [to be] transferred to 
any [one] district [court and thereafter a respective judge] for 
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.”15 During this same 
 
 8. See infra text accompanying notes 39–41. 
 9. See infra text accompanying note 16. 
 10. See discussion infra Part II (discussing what happened in the immediate aftermath 
of the Bhopal gas leak.). 
 11. See discussion infra Part II. 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 53–56. 
 13. Bano Bi v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., 984 F.2d 582, 583 (2d Cir. 1993). 
For a discussion, at the time, of whether a parent company could be held liable, see Allin 
C. Seward III, After Bhopal: Implications for Parent Company Liability, 21 INT’L LAW. 695, 
705 (1987). For a recent paper on how tort law in India has been updated to include the 
elimination of the public-private distinction and the adoption of the parens patriae and 
absolute liability principles, see Arpita Gupta, Mass Tort Jurisprudence and Critical 
Epistemologies of Risk: Dissolution of Public-Private Divide in the Indian Mass Tort Law, 
40 LIVERPOOL L. REV. 227, 227 (2019). 
 14. See Bano Bi, 984 F.2d at 583. 
 15. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018); see also CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, COURTING PERIL: 
THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 13 (2016). In the later part 
of this paper, there is an extensive set of citations to the scholars who have been examining 
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period, the Indian parliament passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster Act, 
which permitted the government of India to serve as the representative 
and trustee of the victims.16 Therefore, when the initial consolidated case 
was filed before Judge Keenan, it was the Indian government that was 
the party suing Union Carbide for injuring the victims in Bhopal. 
In the spring of 1986, Judge Keenan issued his ruling.17 He dismissed 
the plaintiffs’ case on forum non conveniens grounds and ruled that the 
matter ought to be heard and handled by the Indian judiciary.18 Judge 
Keenan’s holding, at the time, received great attention from scholars, 
lawyers, and other observers. Yet, what has garnered much less scrutiny 
over the years is how a number of the assumptions within the opinion, in 
fact, lacked support then and, bluntly put, have not been able to stand 
the test of time. Moreover, even less well-known is that following this 
judgment, Judge Keenan issued an additional sixteen procedural rulings 
between 1986 and 2014 involving the Bhopal disaster.19 In not one of 
these decisions did the plaintiffs ultimately prevail.20 
 
the MDL process, particularly to Professor Andrew Bradt who has been a leading light in 
this field. See infra Part IV. Also, for many who study and follow the MDL process, the 
history of the famous Agent Orange litigation involving, first, Judge George C. Pratt and, 
subsequently, Judge Jack B. Weinstein is emblematic of this statute in action. For an 
overview of how this litigation (and then settlement) played out, see Ralph Blumenthal, 
How Judge Helped Shape Agent Orange Pact, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 1984), https://
www.nytimes.com/1984/05/11/nyregion/how-judge-helped-shape-agent-orange-pact.html; 
see also PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC TORT DISASTERS IN THE 
COURTS 97 (1986); John C. Coffee Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class 
Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343, 1356–58 (1995); John C. Coffee Jr., Litigation Governance: 
Taking Accountability Seriously, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 288, 319 (2010); Michael D. 
Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 
2054 (2012). 
 16. The official name of the law was the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of 
Claims) Act March 29, 1985. Bano Bi v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., 984 F.2d 
582, 583 (2d Cir. 1993); see also Oscar Omar Salazar-Duran, A Human Rights Approach to 
Corporate Accountability and Environmental Litigation, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 733, 752 (2009). 
 17. In re Union Carbide Corp. Bhopal Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986), aff’d as modified, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). 
 18. Id. at 845. 
 19. See infra Part IV. These rulings spanned across five separate cases. One point that 
is important to remember is that these cases can be categorized as those that followed along 
the MDL, those that involved separate litigants who sued for damages based on the injuries 
caused by the 1984 gas leak, and those that involved separate litigants who sued for 
damages based on a lack of environmental remedial measures that Union Carbide had 
promised to undertake. 
 20. As the subsequent sections will discuss, some of these rulings that were appealed 
to the Second Circuit were remanded to Judge Keenan for further deliberation. However, 
ultimately, in not one of these matters did the Second Circuit allow the claimants to proceed 
with their claims—thereby siding with Judge Keenan’s orders to dismiss. For a supportive 
piece of Judge Keenan’s 1986 ruling, see generally Hawkes, supra note 2. 
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The argument of this Article has two aspects. First, there is an in-
depth analysis of what might be called the federal judiciary’s “Bhopal 
Jurisprudence.”21 As will be suggested, as the years went on, Judge 
Keenan’s rulings became increasingly more steadfast in terms of 
dismissing the different plaintiffs’ claims that came before him. Even on 
those rare occasions when the Second Circuit Court of Appeals remanded 
a matter for Judge Keenan to reconsider, his ultimate conclusion was to 
find against the plaintiff’s side, which was not overturned by the 
appellate court. Of course, such outcomes would be completely 
understandable had each of these petitioners set forth weak cases or 
provided little prima facie evidence that did not justify their claims 
moving forward. However, in reality, the opposite occurred. The claims, 
legal arguments, and actual evidence—particularly in those matters 
during the 2000s—were strong and demonstrated that the plaintiffs 
should have at least been allowed to have their cases heard at trial. 
However, time after time, Judge Keenan issued judgments for the 
defendants, dismissing the cases. 
Offering a detailed evaluation of Judge Keenan’s Bhopal 
jurisprudence might make for an interesting paper on its own. However, 
the second part of this Article goes deeper, asking whether, upon 
reflection, Judge Keenan should have been allowed to serve as the sole 
judge for all of the Bhopal matters between 1986 and 2014. Recall that 
the above-referenced MDL process consolidated into a single complaint 
the 145 cases that were filed in 1985 and then brought them under Judge 
Keenan’s authority.22 Subsequently, Judge Keenan issued his forum non 
conveniens decision in 1986 as well as three other MDL rulings in 1989, 
1992, and 1993, respectively.23 
Starting in 2000, however, separate Bhopal cases, unrelated to the 
MDL, were filed in federal court. Yet, Judge Keenan remained as the only 
district court judge to hear these matters. Why? One might think that 
 
 21. This term has been used in the past by scholars. See e.g., UPENDRA BAXI, THE 
BHOPAL VICTIMS IN THE LABYRINTH OF THE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION, at lxviii (1990); Nehal 
Patel & Ksenia Petlakh, Gandhi’s Nightmare: Bhopal and the Need for a Mindful 
Jurisprudence, 30 HARV. J. RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 151, 153, 158, 170–71, 184, 190 (2014). 
Additionally the blog, Law and Other Things, which focuses on law in South Asia, 
particularly India, has used this term in the past. Vasujith Ram, Bhopal: Law, Accidents 
and Disaster, A Digital Archive Initiated by Marc Galanter, LAW & OTHER THINGS (Nov. 2, 
2016, 9:40 AM), https://lawandotherthings.com/2016/11/bhopal-law-accidents-and-disas 
ter/. 
 22. Bano Bi v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., 984 F.2d 582, 583 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 23. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, No. M21-38 (JFK), 1993 WL 
541230 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1993); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, No. MDL 
626, 1992 WL 36135 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1992); In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster 
at Bhopal, No. 21-38 (JFK), 1989 WL 66673 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1989). 
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these later cases would go through what is typically called the “random 
assignment”24 process. However, as Professor Katherine Macfarlane has 
summarized, within the federal district court of the SDNY, the 
assignment system was also accompanied by the “related cases” rule, 
which has “allow[ed] judges to ‘accept’ later-filed cases if they [were] 
related to an earlier-filed case already on their docket.”25 Professor 
Macfarlane notes that traditionally “[t]he decision to accept or reject the 
newly-filed case . . . [was] within the ‘sole discretion’ of the judge.”26 Thus, 
a typical process might involve a plaintiff filing a case in federal court, 
which would first be randomly assigned to a judge by court staff. The 
defendant would then move to have that case transferred to a judge who 
had heard a “related case” in the past. The latter judge could then 
exclusively decide whether or not to take it.27 
Because of ongoing worries that moving parties, in such situations, 
were seeking to transfer cases to judges perceived to be more favorable 
to them, in 2013 the SDNY implemented certain changes to its related 
cases rule.28 Today, a committee comprising “the chief judge and two 
other active judges” evaluate and can reject the request made by a party 
to transfer the case to a related case judge.29 And simply because the legal 
issues or parties may be the same as a previous case does not necessarily 
mean that the two cases will be deemed as related any longer.30 
The purpose of the updated rules was to minimize how parties might 
game the assignment system as well as to reduce the unchecked power 
federal judges were amassing with respect to particular areas of law.31 
 
 24. See Katherine Macfarlane, The Danger of Nonrandom Case Assignment: How the 
Southern District of New York’s ‘Related Cases’ Rule Has Shaped the Evolution of Stop-and-
Frisk Law, 19 MICH. J. RACE & L.199, 205 (2014). 
 25. Id. at 203. 
 26. Id. 
 27. This example draws on lessons provided by Professor Macfarlane. Id. at 222–23. 
Professor Macfarlane’s work focuses on how the well-documented series of “stop-and-frisk” 
cases continually appeared on the docket of Southern District of New York Judge Shira 
Scheindlin, who, over the years, ruled against this policy. Id. at 220–25. Eventually, the 
Second Circuit publicly rebuked Judge Scheindlin on grounds of failing to be impartial and 
then removed her from hearing future such matters. Id. at 204–05, 242–46. 
 28. Id. at 245. 
 29. S.D.N.Y. L.R. 2; see also E.D.N.Y. L.R. 2; Macfarlane, supra note 24, at 245–46. 
Note, the 2018 rules are an updated version of the rules that were amended in 2013. 
 30. S.D.N.Y. L.R. 2; see also E.D.N.Y. L.R. 2; Macfarlane, supra note 24, at 245–46. 
 31. Professor Macfarlane cites to an essay written by Benjamin Weiser & Joseph 
Goldstein, which quotes Chief Judge Loretta Preska discussing the importance of 
transparency and her desire to reduce the influence that one judge can have over the law. 
Macfarlane, supra note 24, at 245–46 (citing Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Federal 
Court Alters Rules on Judge Assignments, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2013/12/24/nyregion/federal-court-alters-rules-on-judge-assignments.ht 
ml). 
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While Professor Macfarlane was writing on Section 1983 cases,32 her 
analysis is relevant to the mass tort context here as well—with an added 
layer offered. As she astutely notes—and rightly worries about—these 
updated rules have an exemption for federal judges who assume senior 
status.33 As Rule 15 states: “A senior judge may keep as much of his or 
her existing docket as that judge desires and furnish the assignment 
committee with a list of all cases which the judge desires to have 
transferred.”34 
In 1996, Judge Keenan earned senior status.35 Even if the latest rules 
were in effect then, he would have been exempt. The initial MDL process 
that led to Judge Keenan being selected as the consolidating judge in 
1985 paved the way for him to hear subsequent non-MDL matters on 
Bhopal between 2000 and 2014. Otherwise put, path dependence—or the 
idea that historical decisions “lock-in”36 future events that may or may 
not be optimal for the greater good—appears to have occurred in this 
situation. The result was that one judge was able to shape and influence 
the outcomes of a series of cases for nearly thirty years. Moreover, the 
continued presence of the senior status exemption means that there is 
nothing to stop this type of situation from occurring again in the future. 
From a normative perspective, such a process runs deeply counter to the 
interests of public policy and has serious implications for how we ought 
to be thinking about issues connected to corporate accountability, 
victims’ rights, and broader notions of due process and social justice. 
This Article will proceed in the following manner. Part II will analyze 
the Bhopal-MDL cases of 1986, 1989, 1992, and 1993. Part III will then 
move to examine the set of non-MDL Bhopal matters that came before 
Judge Keenan beginning in 2000. This discussion will also include the 
role that the Second Circuit played at various points when it was asked 
to intervene on appeal. 
Part IV will address how and why all of these Bhopal matters could 
appear in front of the same judge over the past three decades. 
Furthermore, this Part asks whether the “funneling” of cases into one 
judge’s docket is a normatively positive aspect of our civil procedure 
system. There will be a presentation and evaluation of different points of 
view, including a strong critique of the oft-given argument that the 
current process provides litigants with an “expert adjudicator” who is 
 
 32. See Macfarlane, supra note 24, at 215–25. 
 33. Id. at 246. 
 34. See S.D.N.Y. L.R. 15; see also E.D.N.Y. L.R. 15; Macfarlane, supra note 24, at 246. 
 35. See Keenan, John Fontaine, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/
keenan-john-fontaine (last visited Feb. 15, 2020). 
 36. See Brian W. Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-in by 
Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 117 (1989). 
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specialized, greatly knowledgeable, and judicially efficient. Upon 
surmising that the status quo, in fact, does a disservice to victims such 
as those from the Bhopal disaster, this Article will then move to Part V, 
the Conclusion. Recognizing that judicial economy advocates will remain 
interested in having cases continue to move expeditiously through the 
federal courts, there is nevertheless a call to return to a more randomized 
selection of judges in situations like these, so that plaintiffs seeking 
justice can better have their voices heard.37 
II. THE FIRST MAJOR BHOPAL CASE AND ITS MDL PROGENY 
A.  The 1986 Forum Non Conveniens Decision 
1.  Battle of the Experts 
As stated above, in 1985 the JPML channeled the array of cases that 
had been filed by the Bhopal plaintiffs’ lawyers into Judge Keenan’s 
docket as a single consolidated matter.38 During that year and the early 
part of 1986, the Indian government and Union Carbide wrestled over 
whether the case ought to be heard in the United States or India. The 
manner in which the parties’ interests aligned were unusual, to say the 
least. On the one side, lawyers from Minneapolis, New York, and 
Cincinnati represented the Indian government.39 They argued that the 
U.S. courts were the proper forum for adjudication because Union 
Carbide was headquartered and incorporated in United States and top 
executives resided within the country.40 On the other side, the law firm 
of Kelley Drye & Warren represented Union Carbide, which contended 
that the dispute was best resolved within India because that is where the 
gas spill had occurred.41 
Judge Keenan clearly understood the gravity of the matter, as 
indicated by his sobering opening sentence, which reiterated that “[o]n 
the night of December 2–3, 1984 the most tragic industrial disaster in 
 
 37. In making this argument, this Part will draw particularly upon Macfarlane, supra 
note 24. 
 38. For the case history on this point, see Bano Bi v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics 
Co., 984 F.2d 582, 583 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 39. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Bhopal Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 843 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (noting that the firms were Robins, Zelle, Larson & Kaplan (Minneapolis), 
Barrett, Smith, Schapiro, Simon & Armstrong (New York), and Waite, Schneider, Bayless 
& Chesley Co. (Cincinnati); Hoffinger, Friedland, Dorbish, Bernfeld & Hasen (New York) 
served as liaison counsel). 
 40. Id. at 855. 
 41. Id. at 861. Note that the Christic Institute of Washington D.C. served as of counsel 
for an amicus curiae. Id. at 843. 
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history occurred in the city of Bhopal, state of Madhya Pradesh, Union of 
India.”42 His opinion was twenty-six pages and assessed the different 
arguments presented by each side. Before evaluating these issues, 
however, Judge Keenan did not hesitate to express his dismay at the 
behavior of various members of the American bar who had “travelled the 
8,200 miles to Bhopal in those months” after the gas leak to sign up 
Indian plaintiffs that “did little to better the American image in the Third 
World—or anywhere else.”43 Although he hastened to note that none of 
the plaintiffs’ lawyers in this particular case were involved in such 
actions, Judge Keenan’s affirmative inclusion of this point, right on page 
one, footnote one, could be interpreted as setting the stage of what was 
to come within the substance of the judgment. 
The main issue that Union Carbide sought to have adjudicated 
centered on its argument that the courts in India were the more 
appropriate and convenient forums to hear this case.44 Union Carbide 
cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s Piper Aircraft Company v. Reynolds 
judgment for support, which Judge Keenan agreed was directly on 
point.45 According to the plaintiffs, there were more applicable lower 
court cases, but Judge Keenan held that Piper Aircraft, as well as a 
preceding Supreme Court ruling in Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert, were 
the “touchstones” for deciding this case.46 As Piper Aircraft set forth, in 
order for a district court to rule in favor of a forum non conveniens 
petition, it had to determine whether the alternate venue was “adequate” 
and whether, upon balancing “relevant public and private interest 
factors,” justice would be served.47 Additionally, Judge Keenan, in 
referencing Piper Aircraft, noted that it mattered greatly if the plaintiffs 
were from the United States or abroad because, if it was the former, there 
would be greater deference given to where the plaintiffs wished to litigate 
compared to if they were foreign.48 
 
 42. Id. at 844. 
 43. Id. at 844 n.1. Note, this observation of Judge Keenan’s remark was made years 
back in Marc Galanter, The Transnational Traffic in Legal Remedies, in LEARNING FROM 
DISASTER: RISK MANAGEMENT AFTER BHOPAL 133–57, 147 (Sheila Jasanoff ed., 1994) 
(referring to this event as “the great ambulance chase”); Alan Reed, To Be or Not to Be: The 
Forum Non Conveniens Performance Acted Out on Anglo-American Courtroom Stages, 29 
GA. J. INT’L. & COMP. L. 31, 72–73 (2000); Patrick M. Hanlon & Matthew M. Hoffman, 
Availability of U.S. Courts for Asbestos Actions Arising out of Non-U.S. Exposures, SG057 
ALI-ABA 33, at 41–42 (2001). 
 44. See In re Union Carbide Corp., 634 F. Supp. at 845. 
 45. Id. (citing 454 U.S. 235 (1981)). 
 46. Id. (citing 330 U.S. 501 (1947)). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
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In reviewing these elements, Judge Keenan started with the question 
of whether the Indian courts would be equipped to handle this case.49 For 
the plaintiffs, the answer was a resounding no. India’s tort law system 
was underdeveloped, its judiciary was severely backlogged and slow to 
deliver remedies, and litigants had tremendous difficulty accessing legal 
services.50 Furthermore, within the courts themselves, there existed 
onerous bureaucratic hurdles that inhibited claimants from wanting to 
bring their cases in the first place.51 Professor Marc Galanter, from the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison, who has long been one of the world’s 
leading scholars on Indian law, was hired as an expert witness to support 
these arguments made by the plaintiffs.52 
In his 221-page affidavit, Professor Galanter did not hold back on his 
views that it would be a denial of justice if the case were transferred from 
the SDNY to India.53 For Professor Galanter, the history of British 
colonialism in India had resulted in a mismatch whereby a foreign power 
had placed onto its colony a legal system that did not meet the needs of 
its citizens.54 Inordinate delay, a lack of familiarity with complex tort 
cases by judges, and a legal profession that had insufficient resources, 
expertise, and background on litigating tort matters all were enormous 
obstacles for the Bhopal plaintiffs.55 Add to these obstacles that the 
Indian courts simply did not have the necessary infrastructure, 
technology, and investigative tools that were crucial to hearing such a 
massive, complicated case.56 
 
 49. Id. at 847. 
 50. Id. at 847–48. 
 51. See id. at 847. 
 52. Id. For background on Professor Galanter, see Marc Galanter, U. WIS.-MADISON, 
https://secure.law.wisc.edu/profiles/msgalant@wisc.edu (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). See also 
About Professor Marc Galanter’s Involvement in Bhopal, U. WIS. L. SCH. DIGITAL RE-
POSITORY, https://repository.law.wisc.edu/s/uwlaw/page/about-marc-galanter (last visited 
Jan. 29, 2020). For a discussion of Professor Galanter’s role in this case, see Sheila Jasanoff, 
Bhopal’s Trials of Knowledge and Ignorance, 42 NEW ENG. L. REV. 101, 105 (2008). 
 53. See Affidavit of Marc S. Galanter at 199, In re Union Carbide Corp. Bhopal Gas 
Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (No. 626). For a series of more recent 
works confirming that the court system in India suffers from numerous issues that result 
in a denial of justice to everyday litigants, see Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Bread 
for the Poor: Access to Justice and the Rights of the Needy in India, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 789, 
789–91 (2004); Jayanth K. Krishnan et al., Grappling at the Grassroots: Access to Justice 
in India’s Lower Tier, 27 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 151, 152–54 (2014); Jayanth K. Krishnan & 
Patrick W. Thomas, Surveying Key Aspects of Socio-Legal Scholarship on India: An 
Overview, 11 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 337, 352 (2015). 
 54. See Affidavit of Marc S. Galanter, supra note 53, at 169–70. 
 55. Id. at 172–79. 
 56. Id. at 183–85. 
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Finally, according to Professor Galanter, the procedural rules in 
India were archaic and unfairly disadvantaged parties such as the 
Bhopal victims. Indian law, for example, did not provide for class action 
suits for toxic tort cases.57 Discovery was also notably restricted.58 
Moreover, defendants could easily employ stalling tactics, such as filing 
large numbers of interlocutory appeals.59 And plaintiffs were precluded 
from impleading third-party defendants into civil suits.60 
It is important to note that Professor Galanter’s affidavit was based 
not just on his years of experience in India, but also, quite significantly, 
on the work of Indian lawyers and scholars whom he repeatedly cited.61 
Nevertheless, Judge Keenan opted to disregard his analysis, noting that 
Professor Galanter’s “opinions concerning the Indian legal system, its 
judiciary and the bar are far less persuasive”62 because he was never 
“admitted to practice in India.”63 Instead, Judge Keenan pointed to two 
experts that Union Carbide had hired¾N.A. Palkhivala and J.B. 
Dadachanji, “each of whom had been admitted to practice in India for 
over 40 years” and “[b]oth [of whom] are Senior Advocates before the 
Supreme Court of India.”64 Palkhivala and Dadachanji argued that India 
could indeed handle this type of litigation and that its courts were 
prepared and that Indian judges were ready to deliver justice in a timely 
and innovative fashion.65 There were other cases that, while not as big, 
showed the Indian judiciary to be acting prudently, fairly, and quickly.66 
Moreover, Palkhivala and Dadachanji rejected the idea that the 
Indian courts lacked the necessary infrastructure or technological 
capacity or that there were insufficient numbers of legal professionals to 
assist those in need. After all, given that the Indian government had 
stepped in, the entire power of the state now was behind the victims, 
which meant that all conceivable resources and talent could be 
 
 57. Id. at 192–93. 
 58. Id. at 187–89. 
 59. Id. at 173–75. 
 60. Id. at 195. 
 61. Id. at 170, 172, 175, 180, 201 (noting references to works by Professor Upendra Baxi 
and Professor M.P. Jain); see, e.g., UPENDRA BAXI , THE CRISIS OF THE INDIAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM (1982); M.P. JAIN, OUTLINES OF INDIAN LEGAL HISTORY (4th ed., 1981); Upendra 
Baxi & Marc Galanter, Panchayat Justice: An Indian Experiment in Legal Access, in 3 
ACCESS TO JUSTICE: EMERGING ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 341–86 (Mauro Cappelletti & 
Bryant Garth eds., 1979). 
 62. In re Union Carbide Corp. Bhopal Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842, 847 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 848–49. 
 66. Id. at 848–50. 
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marshalled on their behalf.67 Additionally, Palkhivala and Dadachanji 
denied that Indian tort law was as incomplete and nascent as Professor 
Galanter had argued. They stated that it was more codified than found 
in Indian common law and that, because of the high rates of tort-based 
settlements that occurred within the country, there were simply fewer 
official judgments issued by the Indian courts.68 And then procedurally, 
they rebutted the notion that third parties could not be impleaded; that 
was simply wrong, they asserted, as indicated by Rule 10(2) and section 
151 of the Indian Code of Civil Procedure.69 
Upon reviewing these testimonials, Judge Keenan found Union 
Carbide’s experts to be more convincing than the plaintiffs’ experts. He 
concluded that the Indian courts could adjudicate the Bhopal gas leak 
dispute in an adequate fashion, per the standard set forth in Piper 
Aircraft and Gilbert. His analysis did not end there, however, as this 
discussion next explains. 
2. Judge Keenan’s Evaluation of the Evidence 
The second part of Judge Keenan’s opinion dealt with another crucial 
issue raised in both Gilbert and Piper Aircraft—namely, ensuring that 
the “private interests”70 of the competing parties would be safeguarded. 
Specifically, what this meant, according to the judge, was that he was 
obliged to determine whether the American courts or the Indian courts 
would be the best venue to evaluate the different pieces of evidence that 
each side would likely proffer in order to make their case. Judge Keenan 
began this task by addressing Union Carbide’s argument that “virtually 
all of the evidence [that] will be relevant at trial in this case . . . [was] 
 
 67. Id. at 849. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 850 (noting that Rule 10(2) “allows the court to add additional parties if the 
presence of those parties is ‘necessary in order to enable the Court effectively and 
completely to adjudicate upon and settle all questions involved in the suit’”). Dadachanji’s 
affidavit also notes that section 151 would allow for impleading third parties in the interests 
of justice. Id. at 850–51. Two additional rebuttal points that Union Carbide’s experts made 
were in regards to Professor Galanter’s concerns over not having juries to decide this case 
and not having a legal professional who worked under a contingency fee model, which 
Professor Galanter believed, respectively, would likely hurt the chances of the victims being 
able to redress their grievances fully (and being compensated accordingly) and deprive them 
of access to lawyers who might want to help but who could not because of the prohibition 
on contingency fees. Id. at 851. Union Carbide’s experts flatly rejected these arguments, 
noting first that civil law countries do not have juries (nor does Britain) for civil cases, and 
tort disputes are adjudicated perfectly well in these contexts. Id. Second, the experts noted 
that contingency fees are primarily an American phenomenon and that lawyers in other 
jurisdictions do just fine in serving tort-based clients with their claims. Id. at 851–52. 
 70. Id. at 852. 
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW SPRING  2020 
718 RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:705 
located in India.”71 For example, plant records, plant personnel, and the 
plant itself—which had seven separate facilities—were all there.72 
Moreover, Union Carbide’s position was that its Indian subsidiary 
employees were the individuals that needed to be interviewed, 
investigated, and potentially held to account—not the U.S. parent 
company or its American employees.73 The reason was simple: “[T]he 
Bhopal plant was managed and operated entirely by Indian nationals, 
who were employed by [Union Carbide India Limited (“UCIL”)].”74 
For the plaintiffs, the linkages between the parent company and 
UCIL were intertwined, so much so that it made only logical sense for 
the evidence to be evaluated by U.S. courts. Consider that safety 
inspections on the Bhopal plant had been done by American Union 
Carbide supervisors. Because there had been two earlier plant accidents, 
the plaintiffs believed they deserved an opportunity—in an American 
court—to show how there was a connection between the parent 
corporation and the subsidiary.75 
It was also crucial that the plaintiffs be able to depose and cross-
examine these officials under American rules of evidence. Additionally, 
the plaintiffs argued that they could show that the design of the Bhopal 
facility was directly tied to plans set forth by Union Carbide’s American 
technicians.76 And the plaintiffs rejected the idea that an effective trial 
could not take place in the United States just because the plant was 
located in India.77 In most major toxic tort and product liability cases, 
they contended, “videotapes, pictures, diagrams, schematics and models 
are [known to be] more instructive than actual view.”78 
In determining the issue of how best to balance the private interests 
of both sides, Judge Keenan ultimately came down in favor of Union 
Carbide. He provided several reasons why he felt this was the most just 
outcome. Given that the victims and virtually all the evidence were 
located in India, the transportation of these individuals and other 
“sources of proof” to the United States made little sense.79 Conversely, 
asking the handful of Union Carbide officials from the United States to 
travel to India to testify, if needed, would be both easier and cheaper.80 
 
 71. Id. at 853–54. 
 72. Id. at 852. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 854–56. 
 76. Id. at 855. 
 77. Id. at 860. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 853. 
 80. Id. at 859. 
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Relatedly, and critically, because the Indian government had taken 
over as the representative of the plaintiffs’ interests, it only made sense 
for the case to be in India, since these public officials were located in the 
country. As Judge Keenan held, there was a fairness and due process 
component to this analysis as well; were the case to be held in the United 
States, then many of these witnesses and pieces of evidence likely would 
not make it out of India, thereby depriving the defense from evaluating 
and adequately confronting their accusers.81 
In addition to these “private interest concerns,” Judge Keenan also 
addressed a set of “public interest” factors that needed to be taken into 
account, per the Supreme Court’s Gilbert ruling.82 For example, he raised 
the issue of how hearing the case in the SDNY would cause enormous 
logistical burdens on the court’s resources, staff, and infrastructure. 
Finding jurors would also be difficult, and there would be the constant 
hassle and worry of ensuring proper translation from the Indian 
language of Hindi to English, whenever witnesses so needed it.83 Then 
there were the financial costs that would be imposed on American 
taxpayers.84 While precise dollar amounts could not be estimated, Judge 
Keenan projected that the expenses of hosting the litigation in New York 
would be disproportionately higher than if the case were heard in India.85 
And finally, Judge Keenan concluded upon a simple point—the 
appropriate law to apply was Indian law.86 The accident occurred in 
India; the number of “contacts” who were affected by the disaster were 
far more in India than in the United States; India’s stake in this case was 
paramount; and, as such, an Indian court was most suitably equipped to 
handle and apply Indian law to the case itself.87 Because of his belief that 
the Indian legal system could handle this litigation in an appropriate 
fashion and that justice would be upended if he were to hold otherwise, 
he stated that “[i]t would be sadly paternalistic, if not misguided,” for the 
case to proceed in the United States.88 
Therefore, in sum, Judge Keenan dismissed the plaintiff’s case on 
forum non conveniens grounds. As part of his order, the judge required 
that Union Carbide waive any statute of limitations defense it might 
 
 81. Id. (“While Union Carbide might be deprived of testimony of witnesses or even 
potential third-parties if this action were to proceed in this [U.S.] forum, no such problem 
would exist if the litigation went forward in India.”). 
 82. Id. at 852, 860. 
 83. Id. at 862 
 84. Id. at 867. 
 85. Id. at 862. 
 86. Id. at 866. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 864. 
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make, as well as agree to abide by any judgment reached by an Indian 
court.89 Interestingly, there was one other condition to which the 
company had to adhere. The last sentence of the opinion ended by 
mandating that “Union Carbide shall be subject to discovery under the 
model of the United States Federal Rules of Civil Procedure after 
appropriate demand by plaintiffs.”90 
In the following years, subsequent cases that fell under the MDL 
umbrella came in front of Judge Keenan. The next Section evaluates his 
rulings in each of these. 
B. The Remaining MDL Cases 
On February 14, 1989, an agreement was reached between the 
Government of India and Union Carbide stating that the latter would 
pay $470 million to settle all outstanding claims being made by the 
plaintiffs.91 The Supreme Court of India gave its approval to this 
settlement. The money was to be paid to the Indian government, which 
in turn would disburse the sums to the victims of the Bhopal disaster.92 
This settlement was related to the just-discussed, initial MDL. 
Thereafter, three of the American lawyers representing the victims and 
the Indian government—F. Lee Bailey, Stanley Chesley, and Lionel 
Marks—sought to recoup their fees from the settlement that had been 
brokered.93 They approached Judge Keenan in 1989 in hopes that a 
portion would be set aside to cover the costs they had incurred.94 
 
 89. Id. at 867. 
 90. Id. Although she does not discuss Bhopal/Union Carbide or this decision by Judge 
Keenan, see generally Maggie Gardner, Retiring Forum Non Conveniens, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
390, 395–98 (2017) (noting the ills that have arisen as a result of judges employing this 
doctrine). 
 91. For a discussion of this point, see A Bhopal Timeline, UNIV. WIS. L. SCH. DIG. 
REPOSITORY, https://repository.law.wisc.edu/s/uwlaw/page/a-bhopal-timeline (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2020). See also N.Y. Federal Court Dismisses Bhopal Suit, Finds Union Carbide 
Met Obligations, 10 ANDREWS CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 13 (2003); Mary Elliott Rolle, 
Unraveling Accountability: Contesting Legal and Procedural Barriers in International Toxic 
Tort Cases, 15 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 135, 168 (2003). For an interesting discussion of 
what transpired at the lower level court in Bhopal and then on appeal in the Madhya 
Pradesh High Court, after Judge Keenan’s 1986 dismissal, see Rhonda Wasserman, Equity 
Transformed: Preliminary Injunctions to Require the Payment of Money, 70 B.U. L. REV. 
623, 684–87 (1990). 
 92. A Bhopal Timeline, supra note 91; N.Y. Federal Court Dismisses Bhopal Suit, Finds 
Union Carbide Met Obligations, supra note 91; Rolle, supra note 91; Wasserman, supra 
note 91. 
 93. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, No. 21-38 (JFK), 1989 
WL 66673, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1989). 
 94. Id. at 1. 
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Unlike in his 1986 ruling where he skeptically viewed the motives of 
many of the American lawyers who traveled to Bhopal, Judge Keenan 
praised the ethics and values of Bailey, Chesley, and Marks in this 1989 
case.95 However, he ruled that his earlier judgment, which was upheld by 
the Second Circuit, precluded the lawyers from seeking relief in U.S. 
courts.96 If these lawyers wanted to pursue their claims for fee-
reimbursement, they had to do so within the Indian judiciary. As such, 
the case was dismissed.97 
In 1992, another MDL matter was brought to Judge Keenan. This 
case originally was filed in Texas by lawyers for a class of plaintiffs who 
wanted their claims heard in state court.98 The lawyers argued that since 
Union Carbide had begun its chemical production operations in Texas as 
early as 1941, and continued to maintain a presence there, the state 
courts had jurisdiction to hear the case.99 Union Carbide, however, was 
able to remove the litigation to a federal court within Texas. From there, 
the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation intervened, much to 
the objection of the plaintiffs’ lawyers, and subsequently assigned the 
case to the federal district court of the SDNY, with Judge Keenan 
presiding.100 
The plaintiffs were keen on litigating this case in the Texas state 
courts because of their belief that, under Texas law, the defendants would 
have a more difficult time prevailing on a forum non conveniens 
motion.101 Without much explanation, other than noting that this was a 
“diversity action” that required him to “apply federal forum non 
conveniens law to the issue of the convenience of this forum,” Judge 
Keenan brushed aside this argument.102 
The plaintiffs then put forth a theory stating that even under his own 
1986 ruling, Judge Keenan had to allow them to move forward with this 
case. After six years of trying to pursue their claims in India, the 
plaintiffs stated that the judiciary there was not properly handling the 
complexities of the matters before it. The alternative forum was not 
 
 95. Id. at 2 (“At each stage of the litigation in the United States they demonstrated 
professionalism and a genuine concern for the victims and their families. Their conduct 
insured that those who suffered loss receive fair and careful representation here in the 
United States Courts.”). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, No. MDL 626, 1992 WL 36135, 
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 1992). 
 99. For a history of the Union Carbide Corporation, see History, UNION CARBIDE CORP., 
http://www.unioncarbide.com/History. 
 100. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 1992 WL 36135, at *2. 
 101. Id. at *3. 
 102. Id. 
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comparable. Delay persisted with the courts, and, moreover, the $470 
million settlement that had been reached was woefully inadequate to 
meet the needs of the victims and, in reality, had only come about 
through “unfair and coercive means.”103 Finally, as a response to the 
logistical burdens of trying the case in an American court, the plaintiffs’ 
lawyers offered to cover all of the expenses of those injured who needed 
to travel from India to the United States “for depositions and medical 
examinations.”104 They were even willing to pay for the costs to depose 
those defendants who were located overseas.105 
Nevertheless, Judge Keenan refused to accept these arguments as 
well. Perhaps more troubling, rather than offering a substantive 
rebuttal, he simply referenced his 1986 opinion as the benchmark for why 
he would not let this case proceed. For Judge Keenan, so long as the 
judiciary and Parliament of India continued to believe that the plaintiffs 
could receive timely and adequate justice in the Indian courts, he had no 
reason to question this conclusion.106 That he described the plaintiffs’ 
positions, early in his opinion, as “a thicket of arguments, some of which 
would be labeled imaginative by a kind or charitable observer,”107 no 
doubt sealed the claimants’ fate as to what the outcome in this case would 
be.108 
The final MDL case that Judge Keenan heard was a year later (1993) 
and involved a rehearing of the attorneys’ fees matter from 1989. 
Following that 1989 decision, the Second Circuit took the matter up on 
appeal. The appellate court affirmed Judge Keenan’s decision, ruling that 
he had no jurisdiction to allocate any part of the $470 million settlement 
towards fees for the plaintiffs’ lawyers.109 The lawyers’ best chance would 
be to pursue their claims within the Indian judiciary.110 
Thereafter, the plaintiffs’ lawyers asked the Indian Supreme Court 
to consider whether they could stake a claim from the settlement amount. 
They even sought to place a lien on that portion that would equal the 
 
 103. Id. at *4. 
 104. Id. at *4. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at *3. 
 108. Note in 1993, the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Keenan’s opinion and went one 
step further, declaring that the plaintiffs simply had no standing because of the Indian 
government’s passage of the Bhopal Act, which nullified any other party, except for the 
Indian government, to represent the interests of those who were injured or had died. Bi v. 
Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., 984 F.2d 582, 585 (2d Cir. 1993). 
 109. See Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60, 61-62, 68 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 110. See id. at 68. 
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percentage they said they were owed.111 Their request was denied by the 
Indian Court on the ground that it was entered too late and that it should 
have been proffered during the discussions that the Indian government 
was having with Union Carbide or as the judicial proceeding was 
reviewing the settlement.112 As a result, the lawyers reappeared in Judge 
Keenan’s court in 1993, seeking to pursue a claim against Union Carbide 
under section 475 of the New York Judiciary Law, which permitted 
lawyers to issue a lien on property in expectation of fee payments.113 
Judge Keenan, given his earlier judgment, perhaps not surprisingly 
was unsympathetic. He first held that the New York law only applied to 
a limited set of circumstances, of which this Bhopal matter was not 
one.114 He then criticized the lawyers (whom he had praised in the 1989 
case) now for being lackadaisical. They could have been timely in their 
filings in India—they were not.115 They had enlisted their clients in India 
by using American contingency fee agreements, but they did not do their 
due diligence to learn whether such arrangements were legal under 
Indian regulations—they were not.116 As a last resort, they were now 
seeking a “deep pocket” defendant—Union Carbide—to pay for their fees, 
which the corporation had no obligation to do, according to the judge.117 
As such, he had little difficulty dismissing the case.118 
With this last 1993 judgment, the MDL came to an end. To recap, the 
MDL began with the seminal 1986 forum non conveniens ruling, followed 
by the MDL cases in 1989, 1992, and 1993. In all of these decisions, Judge 
Keenan ruled against the claimants or the claimants’ lawyers and in 
favor of Union Carbide.119 Starting in 2000, a series of new Bhopal-based 
 
 111. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, No. M21-38 (JFK), 1993 WL 541230, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1993). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. According to Judge Keenan, in going only against Union Carbide, the lawyers 
were “heeding the Chesley court’s observation that any claims against UOI would likely be 
precluded by considerations of comity and sovereign immunity.” Id. (citing Chelsey, 927 
F.2d at 67 n.4). The New York law still allows for this petition today. See N.Y. JUD. § 475 
(McKinney 2019). 
 114. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 1993 WL 541230, at *3–4. 
 115. Id. at *4. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at *5. 
 119. It should be noted that after the 1986 decision, the Second Circuit reviewed Judge 
Keenan’s opinion and affirmed—but also “modified”—it as well. See In re Union Carbide 
Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 809 F.2d 195, 205-06 (2d Cir. 1987). The appellate 
court held that Judge Keenan’s rulings that Union Carbide be required to “consent to the 
enforcement of a final Indian judgment,” as well as obliging the company to adhere to 
American discovery rules while litigating this case in India, were both in error. Id. at 205. 
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judgments—that were not MDL-related—emerged from Judge Keenan’s 
court. The next Part examines these rulings and the influence that the 
earlier cases had on these later outcomes. 
III.  THE NON-MDL, BHOPAL-RELATED CASES 
Starting in 2000, the federal courts—namely, Judge Keenan’s court 
and, on occasion, the Second Circuit—issued a combined sixteen rulings 
that related to the Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal. These rulings 
involved two main cases, Sajida Bano et al. v. Union Carbide and Warren 
Anderson120 that went from 2000–05 and Janki Sahu et al. v. Union 
Carbide and Warren Anderson, which lasted from 2005–13.121 As 
explained below, neither of these cases were MDL matters and thus, in 
theory, the plaintiffs’ claims should have stood or fallen on their own, 
independent merits. 
A.  The Sajida Bano Case 
In 2000, Judge Keenan heard a case involving a group of “survivors 
and next-of-kin of victims of the Bhopal Gas Plant disaster of December 
2–3, 1984.”122 It is important to note the history: the plaintiffs were part 
of the class that brought their set of complaints to Judge Keenan back in 
1992. Recall that case was part of the MDL, which was dismissed. Seven 
years then passed and, as Judge Keenan described, a reconstituted group 
of claimants filed a new case with new legal claims in a single district 
against Union Carbide and its Chief Executive Officer, Warren 
Anderson.123 
Thus, the 2000 Sajida Bano case was not part of the MDL from the 
1990s. Nevertheless, it was on Judge Keenan’s docket, and he presided 
over the matter for the next five years as it went through an appeal and 
then remand, followed by another appeal and then a second remand. The 
essence of the case was straightforward. Sajida Bano, together with a 
 
The Second Circuit’s decision, thus, gave Union Carbide an even bigger win than Judge 
Keenan’s original decision. For a further discussion, see Rolle, supra note 91, at 164–65. 
 120. No. 99 Civ. 11329 (JFK), 2000 WL 1225789, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2000), aff’d in 
part, vacated in part Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 121. 418 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Note, as will be discussed, there were 
subsequent related cases that came to be known as Sahu II and Sahu III. See infra Section 
III.B. Also, Judge Keenan’s ruling in 2012 was his last one on this case, and it was affirmed 
by the Second Circuit in 2013. See Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 528 F. App’x 96 (2d Cir. 
2013). 
 122. See Bano, 2000 WL 1225789, at *1. 
 123. Id. at *5. Note, some members from the original 1992 case did participate in this 
later case. 
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class of other plaintiffs, sought to bring multiple causes of action against 
Union Carbide and its then-CEO Anderson under the Alien Tort Claims 
Act (“ATCA”).124 The thrust of the ATCA grievances revolved around the 
plaintiffs’ assertions that the company and Anderson had committed 
egregious human rights violations in how they operated the facility, 
which caused injury, death, and destruction to the thousands of victims 
in Bhopal.125 In addition, they brought a series of nuisance, 
environmental degradation, fraud, and property complaints as part of 
their petition.126 
In a sharp rebuke to the plaintiffs, Judge Keenan granted the 
defendants’ motions to dismiss for failing to state a claim as well as 
summary judgment.127 According to Judge Keenan, the plaintiffs had no 
standing to sue. The Indian Parliament’s passage of the Bhopal Act 
necessarily precluded Sajida Bano and the others from proceeding with 
this suit.128 Judge Keenan pointed to the Indian Supreme Court’s 1990 
decision, Charan Lal Sahu v. Union of India, upholding the 
constitutionality of the statute, as support for the finding that only “the 
Indian Government had exclusive authority to represent the victims.”129 
Given the outcome of Lal Sahu, Judge Keenan then proceeded to hold 
that the Indian government had the sole and absolute power to negotiate 
a civil settlement with Union Carbide for the $470 million that was 
reached.130 As Judge Keenan stated, because the various ATCA causes of 
action being pursued here were civil in nature, and thus fell under the 
umbrella of the settlement, the current plaintiffs were collaterally 
estopped from moving forward with their case.131 
 
 124. Id. The specifics of the claims were listed by Judge Keenan as follows: “(1) Violations 
of international criminal law under the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350; 
(2) Racial discrimination in violation of international law under the ATCA, 28 U.S.C. § 
1350; (3) Cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment under the ATCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1350; (4) 
Violation of the rights to li[f]e, health, and security of the person under the ATCA, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350; (5) Violations of international environmental rights under the ATCA, 28 U.S.C. § 
1350; (6) A consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights under the ATCA, 28 
U.S.C. § 1350.” 
 125. See id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at *15. 
 128. Id. at *10–12. 
 129. Id. at *3 (citing (1990) 1989 SC 639 (India)). 
 130. Id. at *12. 
 131. Id. at *13. Note that as part of their case, the plaintiffs had argued that Union 
Carbide’s criminal activity, which had been investigated by the Indian Government, 
provided them with an avenue to pursue—separately—their various civil claims and their 
ATCA causes of action within the American federal courts. Id. The plaintiffs also argued 
that the “Defendants’ motions [to dismiss and for summary judgment should be ignored by 
Judge Keenan] on the basis of the ‘fugitive disentitlement doctrine.’” Id. at *6. Essentially, 
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One year later, the Second Circuit heard this case on appeal.132 It 
affirmed Judge Keenan’s central holdings, save one.133 At the district 
court level, the plaintiffs had argued that they ought to be able to sue the 
defendants on a number of common law environmental violations that 
were not tied to the 1984 disaster.134 According to the Second Circuit, 
Judge Keenan too summarily dismissed this complaint without providing 
adequate explanation and, as such, remanded on this point.135 However, 
as the court stated, “We are nonetheless confident, particularly in light 
of Judge Keenan’s extensive and intimate familiarity with the Bhopal 
disaster litigation, that we would benefit from his consideration of these 
issues in the first instance.”136 
Subsequently, on remand, Judge Keenan wrote a detailed opinion of 
whether the plaintiffs had a claim on this front.137 This time around, the 
plaintiffs also made an additional request. Knowing that Judge Keenan 
believed that Indian law ought to govern this dispute, they asked that 
the laws of their home jurisdiction be used by Judge Keenan, in his court, 
to decide this matter, for which there was precedent.138 As their amended 
complaint argued, while Indian law was satisfactory on paper, Indian 
courts simply did not execute well enough on providing adequate 
remedies—like the American federal courts historically had.139 
 
what the plaintiffs were saying was that because there were criminal investigations 
pending against Union Carbide in India, which needed to be resolved completely, the 
company ought to be prevented from moving to dismiss the claims being brought by the 
plaintiffs in the United States. See id. at *7. The court, however, disagreed and said that 
the only case it could concern itself with was the civil, tort-based case. See id. The fact that 
there may or may not be a criminal case against Union Carbide (in a foreign jurisdiction, 
no less) was immaterial for the case at bar (Union Carbide and Warren Anderson refused 
to consent or acknowledge that they could be subject to criminal prosecution in India). Id. 
at *8. As the primary support for its holding, the court cited Degen v. United States. Id. at 
*6–8 (citing 517 U.S. 820 (1996)). For a critical evaluation of Bano v. Union Carbide, 
including a rebuke from one of the plaintiffs’ lawyers (H. Rajan Sharma) who critiqued the 
Indian Government’s failure to represent the victims in a zealous fashion, see C. Raj Kumar 
& Pratibha Jain, Last Chance to Render Justice to Bhopal Victims, HINDU (Dec. 13, 2000), 
https://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/2000/12/13/stories/05131349.htm. 
 132. Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120, 120 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 133. Id. at 122. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 133. For a contemporaneous piece that was written with optimism that the 
Second Circuit’s ruling would bring about much-needed justice for the victims, see C. Raj 
Kumar, Bhopal Victims’ Legal Victory, HINDU (Dec. 11, 2001), https://www.thehindu.com/
thehindu/op/2001/12/11/stories/2001121100040100.htm. 
 137. Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 99 Civ.11329 JFK, 2003 WL 1344884, at *3-9 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2003). 
 138. Id. at *3. 
 139. Id. 
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Judge Keenan was not impressed by either the original or new claim. 
He saw the latter change in course to be purely instrumental. New York 
law, which otherwise could have applied to sue on a harm that occurred 
outside the United States, had a statute of limitations that had lapsed, 
he held.140 To argue that Indian law now needed to be employed by an 
American court was simply an end run. Furthermore, he was unwilling 
to forget that the plaintiffs’ original complaint had bemoaned Indian law 
as being insufficient and that these types of inconsistent “pleading 
defects cannot be tolerated . . . in such lengthy and extensive 
litigation.”141 Consequently, he dismissed the case for lack of timeliness, 
as well as reaffirmed his previous decision on the environmental claims 
for why this case could not continue.142 
Once again, the plaintiffs asked the Second Circuit to review the 
case.143 And again, the appellate court sent the matter back to Judge 
Keenan.144 In their appeal, the plaintiffs argued that Judge Keenan’s 
statute of limitations interpretation of the New York law was too 
sweeping and did not distinguish between their property damage and 
personal injury claims against the defendants.145 The Second Circuit 
agreed and asked Judge Keenan to consider whether the plaintiffs could 
proceed, in particular, with the property damage claim as a class 
action.146 
Judge Keenan, upon a rehearing, refused to grant class certification. 
Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, he found that the 
 
 140. Id. at *4–6. 
 141. Id. at *3. 
 142. Id. at *9. These reaffirmed principles included the following: first, one of the main 
plaintiffs, Haseena Bi, argued that because her injuries were patent, the New York law 
provided an exemption to its firm statute of limitations. Id. at *4. The court held otherwise. 
Id. at *5. In addition, she and the others sought to recover for property damage that they 
attributed to Union Carbide’s actions. Id. at *6. There too, the court rejected this complaint 
as “nonsensical.” Id. The plaintiffs also contended that Union Carbide and Anderson 
engaged in fraud and deception in covering up their actions, which resulted in the plaintiffs’ 
injuries (both personal and property). Id. The court found no evidence of such behavior and, 
in fact, went further to hold that Union Carbide had built an adequate hospital and had 
“met its obligations to clean up the contamination in and near the Bhopal plant.” Id. at *9. 
And finally, the court continued to state that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the 
proper venue to litigate all of these types of matters should be in India and not in the United 
States. Id. at *8. 
 143. See Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 361 F.3d 696 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 144. Id. at 717. 
 145. Id. at 706. 
 146. Id. at 702, 713. The appellate court also appeared persuaded by third party reports 
indicating that Bi’s discovery of the property damage occurred later in time, which, if true, 
would have allowed her to bring forth her claim within New York’s statutory period, thus 
vitiating the argument that she had not been timely in filing this cause of action against 
Union Carbide and Anderson. Id. at 712–13. 
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plaintiffs did not have the financial wherewithal to proceed as a class.147 
Moreover, the property claim was based on the damage caused to an 
aquifer that was affecting the entire Bhopal community, rather than to 
individually owned personal property, which, according to the judge, 
negated the right to proceed. Finally, he refused to reverse his earlier 
dismissal, noting that he could not “allow [the p]laintiffs to intervene in 
or to certify a class for a claim that was [already properly] dismissed.”148 
This last ruling put a final end to the Sajida Bano case. The Second 
Circuit did not contest Judge Keenan’s decision and the matter was 
closed. These plaintiffs encountered a similar fate to the earlier litigants 
of the 1980s and 1990s. Even though this case was supposed to have been 
evaluated independently on its own merits, Judge Keenan’s reasons for 
repeatedly granting the defendants’ various motions to dismiss were 
clearly tied to the MDL. Over the ensuing decade, a similar trend 
emerged in a subsequent case. 
B.  The Sahu Case(s) 
Beginning in 2005, a second group of plaintiffs, led by a victim of the 
disaster, Janki Bai Sahu, brought a series of new claims against Union 
Carbide and Warren Anderson.149 This class of petitioners sought to show 
that the parent company could be held liable in the United States for the 
tortious actions of its Indian subsidiary.150 Specifically, the plaintiffs 
complained that there had not been sufficient medical monitoring of 
those who had suffered injury, nor was there adequate remediation.151 
Judge Keenan began this discussion by bluntly stating that he “could 
dismiss all of [the p]laintiffs’ claims based on forum non conveniens.”152 
The reason was simple: there were many similarities between this matter 
and the first Bhopal case from 1986. However, because this was a 
separate situation, Judge Keenan noted that it demanded an analysis of 
the “[p]laintiffs’ claims based on the merits.”153 On its face, this statement 
might have offered hope for the claimants that they would be receiving a 
fresh take on their case—one unsaddled by the influences of previous 
rulings. Yet, such optimism was dashed almost immediately thereafter. 
 
 147. Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 99 Civ. 11329 (JFK), 2005 WL 2464589, at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2005) (“Rule 23(a)(4) allows certification only if ‘the representative parties 
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.’”). 
 148. Id. at *4. 
 149. See Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 418 F. Supp. 2d 407, 409 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 150. Id. at 408–09. 
 151. Id. at 409, 411. 
 152. Id. at 410. 
 153. Id. 
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For example, throughout the substance of his opinion, Judge Keenan 
repeatedly referenced his previous rulings in the Sajida Bano and MDL 
cases.154 Regarding Bano, he pointed out that he had already decided that 
providing relief on the claims of medical monitoring and remediation 
were “infeasible.”155 He further held—similar to what he decided before 
in the MDL matter—that the connection between Union Carbide-U.S. 
and Union Carbide-India was too tenuous. They did not act as “joint 
tortfeasors,”156 nor did they act in a nefarious manner with one another 
to commit an intentional tort. Judge Keenan also found no evidence that 
there was any duplicitous behavior on the part of Anderson or any Union 
Carbide official to cause the accident or perpetuate the harms that had 
been continuing.157 But as he concluded his opinion, Judge Keenan did 
offer one relatively modest accommodation for the plaintiffs: he granted 
them a stay so that they could have more time to engage in further 
discovery for a possible claim of corporate veil piercing.158 
Following this decision, the litigation took on a dizzying set of turns. 
The plaintiffs filed an appeal to the Second Circuit. Before a decision was 
made by the appellate court, though, Judge Keenan ruled on the 
corporate veil piercing motion in November of 2006. He issued a 
dismissal opinion that forcefully ended with this line: “This case is closed, 
and the Court directs the Clerk to remove the case from the Court’s 
docket.”159 
Yet, the case in fact was not closed. In 2008, the Second Circuit 
remanded the entire matter back to Judge Keenan’s court, holding that 
he had too summarily evaluated the evidence amassed by the plaintiffs 
and had not given them enough time to reply to the defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment.160 Meanwhile, the previous year (2007), a second 
set of plaintiffs (some of whom were the same as the plaintiffs in the first 
Sahu case) had filed a parallel case against Union Carbide and Anderson, 
and added to the list the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh, which had 
 
 154. Id. at 411. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 412–13. 
 157. Id. at 412–15. 
 158. Id. at 415–16. 
 159. See Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 04 Civ. 8825 (JFK), 2006 WL 3377577, at *11 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2006). 
 160. See Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 548 F.3d 59, 67– ⁠70 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Sahu III”). 
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taken over the Bhopal facility.161 This case came to be known as Sahu 
II.162 
On remand regarding Sahu I, there were separate but related 
hearings that took place during 2010. Two of these matters involved the 
plaintiffs asking for more time for discovery and for compelling the 
defendants to turn-over additional documents. Judge Keenan denied 
both these requests.163 In another one of the hearings, the plaintiffs 
boldly asked Judge Keenan to recuse himself from any further 
deliberations and to assign the case to a different judge.164 Their position 
was clear: Judge Keenan was too wedded to his earlier decisions, which 
made it impossible for him to consider new Bhopal-based evidence in an 
impartial manner.165 They also asserted that he had made statements in 
his previous rulings that demonstrated hostility to the plaintiffs’ claims 
and that, in order to preserve the appearance of justice, it was only fair 
that another unbiased judge preside in matters going forward.166 
Unremarkably, Judge Keenan was not convinced. He rebutted each 
of these points with what he argued were perfectly and rationally legal 
reasons for his past rulings. He also noted that not once had the Second 
Circuit commented on his lack of fairness or impartiality. He thereafter 
dismissed the motion.167 
By 2012, the defendants (Union Carbide and Warren Anderson) 
sought summary judgment to dismiss the entire Sahu I case in their 
favor.168 Judge Keenan agreed, holding that neither the American 
 
 161. The group, EarthRights International, has been the leading organization to bring 
these cases to the U.S. federal courts. The organization’s website has a detailed history and 
timeline of its involvement in these matters. See Sahu v. Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS, 
https://earthrights.org/case/sahu-v-union-carbide/#timelineff69-1a905f26-f4b6 (“In addi-
tion to EarthRights International (ERI), counsel for the plaintiffs have included Sharma & 
DeYoung LLP, Curtis V. Trinko, Hausfeld LLP, and Cohen Milstein Sellers & Toll PLLC. 
EarthRights International has worked closely with the International Campaign for Justice 
in Bhopal and the Bhopal Group for Information and Action to pursue justice for Bhopal 
communities.”). 
 162. Id.; see also Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 475 F.3d 465 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam) 
(“Sahu II”). 
 163. Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 04 Civ. 8825 (JFK), 2010 WL 909074, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2010); see also Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 746 F. Supp. 2d 609, 612 
(S.D.N.Y. 2010); Sahu v. Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS, supra note 161. 
 164. See Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 04 Civ. 8825 (JFK), 2010 WL 532307, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2010). 
 165. Id. at *2. 
 166. Id. at *3–5. 
 167. Id. at *1. 
 168. Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 04 Civ. 8825 (JFK), 2012 WL 2422757, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. June 26, 2012); see also Sahu v. Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS, supra note 161. 
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company nor its CEO were liable as tortfeasors.169 They were not 
responsible for the environmental degradation and pollution that 
occurred in the aftermath of the leak and there was not enough of a nexus 
between Union Carbide-India and its American parent company to 
justify piercing the corporate veil.170 Referring to the tactics of the 
plaintiffs’ lawyers as an “expedition worthy of Vasco da Gama,”171 Judge 
Keenan granted the defendants’ motion.172 
A year later, the Second Circuit affirmed this decision, bringing to a 
close the Sahu I litigation.173 In 2014, the plaintiffs in Sahu II saw their 
hopes of recovery end as well.174 On similar grounds, Judge Keenan 
granted summary judgment to the defendants.175 After a petition to the 
Second Circuit was denied and the appeals process for this case was 
exhausted, the Bhopal jurisprudence in the federal courts was over by 
2016.176 The various claimants who had come before Judge Keenan in 
nearly thirty years of hearings had ultimately failed to prevail in having 
even one single complaint heard by a trier of fact. The next Part critically 
examines this sad reality and analyzes whether justice was served, both 
procedurally and substantively. 
IV.  HOW JUDGE KEENAN RECEIVED THE BHOPAL CASES AND THE 
RATIONALE OF HIS RULINGS 
A.  The Process Angle 
The introductory section of this Article discussed how the federal 
district court in the SDNY adheres to the “related cases rule.”177 As 
Professor Macfarlane’s analysis has shown, this rule gives deference to 
 
 169. See Sahu, 2012 WL 2422757, at *1; see also Sahu v. Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS, 
supra note 161. 
 170. See Sahu, 2012 WL 2422757, at *20–23; see also Sahu v. Union Carbide, 
EARTHRIGHTS, supra note 161. 
 171. Sahu, 2012 WL 2422757, at *2; see also Sahu v. Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS, 
supra note 161. 
 172. Sahu, 2012 WL 2422757, at *23; see also Sahu v. Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS, 
supra note 161. 
 173. Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 528 F. App’x 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Sahu v. 
Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS, supra note 161. 
 174. See Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 07 Civ. 2156 (JFK), 2014 WL 3765556, at *18 
(S.D.N.Y. July 30, 2014); see also Sahu v. Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS, supra note 161. 
 175. Sahu, 2014 WL 3765556, at *18; see also Sahu v. Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS, 
supra note 161. Note, here the defendants in this case were Union Carbide and the State of 
Madhya Pradesh because by this time they had taken title to the Union Carbide-India 
facility. 
 176. See Sahu v. Union Carbide, EARTHRIGHTS, supra note 161. 
 177. See text accompanying notes 16–22. 
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judges who wish to hear present and future cases connected in subject 
matter to earlier ones that they have adjudicated.178 The lessons provided 
by Professor Macfarlane apply here as well.179 Namely, Judge Keenan 
had heard the first Bhopal case in 1986, and, thereafter, his colleagues 
on the bench were willing to defer to him on all subsequent, Bhopal-
related matters for the next thirty years. 
One intellectually akin antecedent for having the related cases rule 
in effect can be traced back to the work of Max Weber. In classic Weberian 
tradition, in order to arrive at truth and a normatively positive outcome 
in a given situation, specialization of the investigator was key.180 The 
idea was simple: specialization resulted in the more efficient use of time 
and resources. Moreover, a specialist’s expertise offered legitimacy for 
any decisions eventually rendered.181 For Weber, what might be 
described as “cool, detached rationality” needed to pervade the decision-
making process, and those who had highly technical skill sets were in the 
best position to accomplish this objective.182 
On its face, it might seem completely reasonable that Judge Keenan 
would be the natural jurist to hear the thirty years of litigation on 
Bhopal. He had the most familiarity with the original case, as well as the 
subsequent MDL matters that came before him. Furthermore, Judge 
Keenan has been widely admired within the SDNY. As Michael 
Armstrong, a former Assistant U.S. Attorney recently noted, “I do not 
know of another judge who is as uniformly liked as he is” and that “[o]n 
anyone’s list of the best three judges in the Southern District of New York 
at any time over the past 25 years, John Keenan is going to be one of 
 
 178. See Macfarlane, supra note 24, at 203. 
 179. Id. 
 180. See MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 135–36 (H.H. Gerth & 
C. Wright Mills eds., 2009). 
 181. See also id. 
 182. Note Weber contrasted this approach with what he called “Kadi justice,” or 
informal, capricious decisions made by adjudicators who dressed up their judgments in 
language of “concrete ethical standards.” In reality, these Kadi-type judgments “lack[ed] 
definitive criteria,” which Weber found to be an unacceptable method of decision-making. 
See Susan Hekman, The Epistemology of Moral Voice: Displacing Hegemony in Moral/
Legal Discourse, in ENGENDERING RATIONALES 291–93 (Nancy Tuana & Sandra Morgen 
eds., 2001). There have been critics of Weber on this point, who argue that he did not have 
a firm grasp of how Kadi justice operated in Islamic societies. See e.g., Asifa Quaraishi, On 
Fallibility and Finality: Why Thinking Like a Qadi Helps Me Understand American 
Constitutional Law, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 339, 339 n.1; Joyce S. Sterling & Wilbert E. 
Moore, Weber’s Analysis of Legal Rationalization: A Critique and Constructive Modification, 
2 SOC. F. 67, 73–74 (1987). See generally LEON SHASKOLSKY SHELEFF, SOCIAL COHESION 
AND LEGAL COERCION: A CRITIQUE OF WEBER, DURKHEIM, AND MARX (1997); David 
Schneiderman, Judging in Secular Times: Max Weber and the Rise of Proportionality, 63 
SUP. CT. L. REV. 557, 564–65 (2013). 
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them.”183 Michael Martin, a faculty member at Fordham (Judge Keenan’s 
alma mater) has remarked that he “is the epitome of all that a judge 
should be . . . [including] [h]is commitment to serving the public and his 
dedication to ethical principles.”184 And Robert Fiske, a former U.S. 
Attorney of the SDNY (1976–80) and now senior counsel at Davis Polk, 
has stated that, regarding the Bhopal case, Judge Keenan “handled it 
beautifully.”185 
Of course, the last comment by Fiske does not mention that in reality 
there was not just one Bhopal matter that Judge Keenan heard. 
Nevertheless, given that he had acquired international recognition after 
that first case in 1986—along with the fact that he possessed this 
enormous social capital—if any judge were to have the related case rule 
apply, it would be Judge Keenan. His deep knowledge of the initial 
Bhopal case made him, in Weberian terms, a specialist who could provide 
rational, nuanced, and objective guidance for subsequent parties in 
future matters relating to the chemical disaster. Recall, the whole idea of 
the MDL statute was to consolidate and make more efficient, for the 
federal court system, similarly situated cases that spanned the different 
federal courts.186 The judge assigned to hear these consolidated matters 
was charged with supervising discovery and all pre-trial motions. The 
judge also had the power to promote settlements—but also to dismiss the 
case if it was found to have no merit. Where neither occurred, the case 
was to be remanded to the court where the claim was originally filed.187 
Several scholars have studied the MDL process in great detail. 
Notably, in recent years, Professor Andrew Bradt has been arguably the 
most prominent researcher examining the operation of the MDL system 
and how it came into existence.188 As he demonstrates, the original goal 
of a “small group of scholars and judges that invented MDL and 
 
 183. See Ross Galin, Hon. John F. Keenan: U.S. District Judge for the Southern District 
of New York, FED. L., June 2016, at 21 (2016), https://news.law.fordham.edu/wp-content/
uploads/2016/06/KeenanFederalLawyerProfile.pdf. 
 184. Id. 
 185. See id. at 23; Robert B. Fiske, Jr., DAVIS POLK, davispolk.com/profesionals/Robert-
fiske (last visited Mar. 4, 2020). Also see another quote from U.S. Magistrate Judge Leda 
Wettre, who stated that “Judge Keenan is one of the most talented—yet most humble—
people I know . . . . All of his former clerks have tried to emulate him. None of us will ever 
achieve that combination of intelligence, humor, common sense, and compassion that 
makes him so special, but we are all better lawyers and people for having tried.” Galin, 
supra note 183, at 26. 
 186. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018). 
 187. Id. 
 188. See Andrew D. Bradt, “A Radical Proposal”: The Multidistrict Litigation Act of 
1968, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 831 (2017); Andrew D. Bradt and D. Theodore Rave, The 
Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1259 
(2017). 
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shepherded it to enactment” was straightforward.189 These advocates 
engaged in “an intentional power grab” to stem what they perceived to be 
an oncoming wave of mass tort litigation.190 This group acted 
strategically. They feared that parties and lawyers, and even some 
sympathetic individual judges, around the country would actively use 
mass tort litigation as a vehicle to advance social policy and, in the 
process, gridlock the federal courts. As a result, Professor Bradt explains 
that the 1968 legislation was crafted so that “[c]ontrol of these cases . . . 
[was] centralized in the hands of a single and active judge—specifically a 
judge committed to strong pretrial case management who would direct 
the conduct of the nationwide litigation from the bench.”191 
Given this history, Judge Keenan, it would seem, was simply 
adhering to the intent of the statute’s drafters when deciding the 
subsequent MDL matters that occurred after the initial 1986 case. The 
twist in this story though is that after 1993, the different Bhopal matters 
that occupied Judge Keenan’s docket were not part of the MDL. Rather, 
they were separate. What appears to have occurred, however, is that the 
MDL process created a type of path dependence for all the Bhopal 
matters that came into the federal courts. Even though these later cases 
were not part of the original MDL, they were effectively treated as such. 
Judge Keenan was deemed the expert, and with the related cases rule in 
place, he received deference from his federal court colleagues that he 
should be the one to preside over these later matters. 
It is interesting to note this connection between MDL and the related 
cases rule. The federal courts literature discusses these concepts in 
important ways. There is the aforementioned work by scholars such as 
Professors Bradt and Macfarlane, respectively. Regarding the MDL, in 
particular, others too have written on it from significant perspectives.192 
 
 189. Bradt, supra note 188, at 834, 838–39 (noting that the main proponents were 
federal district court Judge William Becker from Missouri, Dean Phil Neal of the University 
of Chicago Law School, Chief Judge Alfred Murrah of the Tenth Circuit, and federal district 
court Judge Edwin Robinson from Illinois). 
 190. Id. at 907. 
 191. Id. at 839. 
 192. For other key works by Bradt in this area, see Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore 
Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers Squibb and the Federalization of 
Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251 (2018); Andrew D. Bradt & Zachary D. Clopton, 
MDL v. Trump: The Puzzle of Public Law in Multidistrict Litigation, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 
ONLINE 85 (2018); Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1165 (2018). As stated, the Columbia Law Review also has been active in 
publishing pieces on MDL. See supra note 15; see also JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., 
ENTREPRENEURIAL LITIGATION: ITS RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE, 132–55 (2015); Robert G. 
Bone, Securing the Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1155 
(2006); Bradt, supra note 188; Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure and Power, 46 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 513 (1996); Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical 
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By examining how the series of Bhopal cases has transpired over the 
years, this Article builds upon this past literature by showing that the 
MDL system, in fact, can also influence how distinct, separate, non-MDL 
matters are still funneled into that same judge’s docket. But there are 
serious consequences to this reality, which should cause concern for those 
who have argued that judicial efficiency and judicial expertise justify 
eschewing the randomized selection of judges in the docket-setting 
process. 
B.  Substantive Concerns with the Rulings Themselves 
1.  Returning to the 1986 Forum Non Conveniens Case 
Much of the first part of Judge Keenan’s 1986 forum non conveniens 
ruling was premised on the belief that the Indian experts hired by Union 
Carbide had more credibility than the plaintiffs’ expert, Professor Marc 
Galanter. However, rather than providing data, empirics, or metrics, the 
two experts from the Union Carbide side offered only their professional 
opinion based on their own experiences as Senior Advocates in India.193 
 
Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1507 (2008); Elizabeth Chamblee 
Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67 (2017); Elizabeth 
Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation: The 
Social Network, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1445 (2017); Howard M. Erichson, What MDL and 
Class Actions Have in Common, 70 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 29 (2017); Abbe R. Gluck, 
Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation’s Place in the Textbook 
Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669 (2017); Deborah R. Hensler, The Role 
of Multi-Districting in Mass Tort Litigation: An Empirical Investigation, 31 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 883, 886–87 (2001); Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious Doctrines: The Quasi-Class Action, 80 
U. CIN. L. REV. 389 (2011); Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 L. & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 3, 29–35 (1991); Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex 
Litigation If a Class Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205 (2008); Charles Silver & 
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: 
Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 108–10 (2010); Margaret S. Thomas, 
Morphing Case Boundaries in Multidistrict Litigation Settlements, 63 EMORY L.J. 1339, 
1341 (2014); Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict 
Consolidations: Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 U. KAN. L. REV. 775, 798 
(2010). For a non-MDL piece that nevertheless discusses the influence that judges can have 
on an area of the law if they are able to have a “dominating [effect on] the development of” 
that law, see Margaret V. Sachs, Superstar Judges as Entrepreneurs: The Untold Story of 
Fraud-on-the Market, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1207, 1213 (2015). 
 193. See Aff. of N.A. Palkhivala in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss on Forum Non 
Conveniens Grounds, In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in 
December, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (1986) (No. 21-38) (on file with author); Aff. of J.B. 
Dadachanji in Supp. of Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss on Forum Non Conveniens Grounds, In re 
Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December, 1984, 634 F. Supp. 
842 (1986) (No. 21-38) (on file with author). The term Senior Advocate refers to the highest 
level of courtroom litigator in India. It is parallel to a Queen’s Council barrister in the U.K. 
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To be sure, their reputations within the Indian legal profession were 
stellar. Nanabhoy (Nani) Palkhivala (1920–2002) was a historically 
important lawyer in India. A constitutional expert, prominent rights 
activist, leading economist, and former Ambassador to the United States, 
Palkhivala was regarded as one of India’s best litigators in the post-
independence era.194 J.B. Dadachanji (1921–2007) too was an 
accomplished lawyer in his own right. Working both in the Indian 
Supreme Court and in the corporate law firm sector, Dadachanji 
established himself as one of India’s great business lawyers during the 
twentieth century.195 
That said, their respective declarations read as though they were 
personally offended that an individual they saw as an outsider would 
have the temerity to criticize the system in which they worked.196 For 
example, Palkhivala viewed Professor Galanter’s assessment—that the 
Indian legal system had structural problems in delivering tort remedies 
to victims—as “slanderous” and “unredeemable” as well as “inapt,” 
“untenable,” and “ludicrous.”197 Dadachanji, in his short statement, used 
the word “incorrect” eleven times in rebutting Professor Galanter’s 
contention.198 He also proclaimed that Professor Galanter’s affidavit 
“libel[ed] the Indian Courts, the Indian bar and the Indian legal system” 
and that such skepticism about the Indian judiciary was “inappropriate 
and callous.”199 Returning to Palkhivala, he believed that since “[t]he 
claimants ha[d] no less a champion than the sovereign Union 
Government,”200 the Indian judiciary would clearly make this case a 
 
 194. See Aff. of Palkhivala, supra note 193, at 222–23; see also M.V. KAMATH, NANI A. 
PALKHIVALA – A LIFE (2012); SOLI J. SORABJEE & ARVIND P. DATAR, NANI PALKHIVALA: THE 
COURTROOM GENIUS (2012). 
 195. See Aff. of Dadachanji, supra note 193, at 72. 
 196. Id.; see also Aff. of Palkhivala, supra note 193, at 223. Note, Professor Marc 
Galanter’s affidavit for the plaintiffs alone was over 220 pages, compared to the sworn 
statements of Palkhivala and Dadachanji that were, respectively, eight and thirteen pages. 
 197. See Aff. of Palkhivala, supra note 193, at 226, 228. 
 198. See Aff. of Dadachanji, supra note 193, at 76–77, 80–82, 84. 
 199. Id. at 74, 79. 
 200. See Aff. of Palkhavia, supra note 193, at 228; see also Aff. of Dadachanji, supra note 
193, at 78–79 (“Delay is a problem only in routine cases and not in the present type of 
litigation. The importance of and interest in the present litigation is apparent from the fact 
that the Parliament has put the Government in place of the citizens by enacting The Bhopal 
Gas Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985. This shows that the Government itself 
regards the present litigation as a matter of major public interest. It has, pursuant to the 
Bhopal Act, acted for all claimants in the United States. and it could do so in India as well. 
As the sovereign, the Government has the power to remedy all of the supposed problems 
mentioned in the Galanter affidavit, such as the facilities and staff made available to 
Judges to help them in their work.”). 
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priority, thereby quelling any worry that the matter would languish in 
the courts for an unreasonable period of time. 
Both advocates also noted that, if need be, the government could 
establish “Special Tribunals” to handle this case.201 Such a practice was 
routine in other high-profile cases in order to expedite claims. And they 
lauded the Indian courts for being creative, innovative, and able to grasp 
the complexities demanded by both sides. In particular, Dadachanji’s 
affidavit noted that the Indian judiciary had repeatedly demonstrated its 
sophisticated nature through its various landmark decisions.202 
These declarations notwithstanding, in actuality, research has long 
shown that the Indian courts struggle with delay, backlog, and the 
enforcement of arrears.203 In addition, the idea that the government’s 
representation of the plaintiffs necessarily would result in a quicker 
completion of the case failed to recognize the reality of events. To begin, 
the main assets of Union Carbide were located in the United States. The 
Indian government would first need to obtain a favorable ruling from the 
Indian courts and then take that judgment to a federal court in the 
United States for enforcement to collect damages.204 
 
 201. See Aff. of Dadachanji, supra note 193, at 81; Aff. of Palkhivala, supra note 193, at 
228. 
 202. See Aff. of Dadachanji, supra note 193, at 74–76. Both experts provided other 
sweeping statements and rhetorical anecdotes. Aff. of Palkhivala, supra note 193, at 224, 
228 (“The Indian judiciary is wholly competent to deal with any dispute in any field of law, 
and has, in the 35 years of the history of our Republic, ably dealt with far more complex 
issues than those arising from the gas plant disaster at Bhopal. . . . The Bhopal Act [which 
allowed the government to represent the plaintiffs] by itself is wholly sufficient to insulate 
[the] Bhopal claimants from the law’s proverbial delays. There is no ‘inadequacy’ or 
‘deficiency’ in the Indian legal system which cannot be set right by the Government of India 
within a matter of days.”); Aff. of Dadachanji, supra note 193, at 77 (“It is further incorrect 
to say that Judges do not promote settlement in India. In fact, in recent years in my 
experience, there have been more settlements promoted by Judges. . . . Undoubtedly, the 
sophistication of Indian System causes some delay in administration of justice. However, 
the delay can be and has been overcome by Courts in matters involving substantial 
questions which are of great public importance.” (emphasis added)). 
 203. For studies that have discussed this point, see Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 53, 
at 789; Krishnan & Thomas, supra note 53, at 340; Krishnan et al., supra note 53, at 179. 
 204. For a discussion of foreign parties seeking to use U.S. courts, see Hannah L. 
Buxbaum, Foreign Governments as Plaintiffs in U.S. Courts and the Case Against “Judicial 
Imperialism,” 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 653, 675, 693, 697 (2016) (referencing briefly the 
Bhopal case and the concerns of the Indian government in pursuing the case in the Indian 
courts); Hanlon & Hoffman, supra note 43, at 41; S.I. Strong, Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts: Problems and Possibilities, 33 REV. LITIG. 45, 70–71 
(2014); Nadja Vietz, Recognition of Foreign Judgments in U.S. Courts, HARRIS BRICKEN 
(Nov. 9, 2018), https://harrisbricken.com/blog/recognition-foreign-judgments-us-courts/. 
For a piece that looks at how domestic laws try to bring about resolution in transnational 
disputes, see Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93 
MINN. L. REV. 815, 820, 833 (2009). For another study looking at the influx of transnational 
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The problem, however, was with the structural framework of India’s 
judicial system. Dating back to colonial times, India’s civil procedure code 
has provided lawyers with various interlocutory appeals, which they 
have frequently and successfully used to delay cases from being 
completed.205 Union Carbide, with its expert Indian lawyers, would likely 
have employed these same tactics in order to have prevented a quick 
disposition of the case. 
Furthermore, with respect to Palkhivala and Dadachanji’s 
suggestion that a special or “fast-track” tribunal could be established to 
expedite the process, research has found that many of the ills that plague 
the regular court system in India often migrate to alternative forums, 
with the result being delays and serious questions about the quality of 
justice being delivered within these supposedly faster settings.206 
Relatedly, India suffers from enormous judicial vacancies so that, 
frequently, overburdened judges in the regular courts are asked to sit in 
specialized forums, which only compounds their workload and results in 
delays now in two different venues.207 And even if an Indian court 
(regular or fast-track) eventually issued a favorable judgment to the 
plaintiffs, it would be easy to imagine Union Carbide proffering some 
type of lack of due process argument in the U.S. courts during the 
enforcement stage.208 There thus would be the potential for Union 
 
cases at the U.S. Supreme Court, see Austen L. Parrish, Personal Jurisdiction: The 
Transnational Difference, 59 VA. J. OF INT’L. L. 97, 99, 122 (2019). 
 205. For studies that have discussed this point, see Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 53, 
at 789; Krishnan & Thomas, supra note 53, at 351; Krishnan et al., supra note 53, at 178–
79. 
 206. See Upendra Baxi & Marc Galanter, Panchayat Justice: An Indian Experiment in 
Legal Access, in 3 ACCESS TO JUSTICE: EMERGING ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 377–80 (Mauro 
Cappelletti & Bryant Garth eds., 1979); R. KUSHAWAHA, WORKING OF NYAYA PANCHAYATS 
IN INDIA 2 (1977); S.N. MATHUR, NYAYA PANCHAYATS AS INSTRUMENTS OF JUSTICE 43–77 
(1997); Catherine S. Meschievitz & Marc Galanter, In Search of Nyaya Panchayats: The 
Politics of a Moribund Institution, in THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: COMPARATIVE 
STUDIES 65 (Richard Abel ed., 1982); Galanter & Krishnan, supra note 53, at 789–90; 
Krishnan & Thomas, supra note 53, at 340; Krishnan et al., supra note 53, at 180; Gene 
Kassebaum, Lok Adalat: A State Sponsored Alternative to Court Litigation of Personal 
Injury, Other Civil and Criminal Cases in South India 5 (1989) (unpublished manuscript) 
(on file with author); Catherine S. Meschievitz, Panchayat Justice: State-Sponsored 
Informal Courts in 19th and 20th Century India, Disputes Processing Research Program 
(Inst. for Legal Studies, Working Paper 8:1, 1987). 
 207. See Baxi & Galanter, supra note 206; KUSHAWAHA, supra note 206; MATHUR, supra 
note 206; Kassebaum, supra note 206; Krishnan et al., supra note 53, at 180; Meschievitz, 
supra note 206. 
 208. In fact, a roughly analogous situation has played out with respect to the Chevron 
Corporation’s litigation in Ecuador. See Karan Nagarkatti & Gary McWilliams, 
International Tribunal Rules in Favor of Chevron in Ecuador Case, REUTERS (Sept. 7, 
2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chevron-ecuador/international-tribunal-rules-in-
RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW SPRING  2020 
2020]  HOW INDIAN VICTIMS FAILED TO GET JUSTICE 739 
Carbide to tie up litigation in both the Indian courts and American courts 
for a long period of time.209 
And finally, there were the claims relating to India’s legal profession. 
Palkhivala and Dadachanji vigorously argued that there was no shortage 
of Indian lawyers capable of handling this case. But this assertion was 
belied by the empirical reality that, historically, most lawyers in the 
country were individual litigators who worked primarily on petty civil 
and criminal matters, with many struggling even to eke out an 
existence.210 Research done since that period illustrates that while there 
has been a growth in the corporate bar as well as of law firms engaging 
in more global transactions—especially since the liberalization of India’s 
 
favor-of-chevron-in-ecuador-case-idUSKCN1LN1WS. Between the mid-1960s and the early 
1990s, the American company, Texaco, operated in Ecuador. Id. A group of Ecuadorian 
villagers/plaintiffs brought suit against Texaco claiming a number of environmental 
violations and ecological abuses by the company. Id. In 1998, an agreement was struck 
between Texaco and the Ecuadorian government, whereby the former paid some $40 million 
for what would be cleanup costs. Id. In 2001, Chevron bought Texaco. Id. Subsequently, a 
class action, toxic tort suit was brought against Chevron, and in 2011 an Ecuadorian court 
ruled that Chevron owed damages in the amount of $18 billion. Id. That amount was later 
reduced to $9.5 billion on appeal. Id. Thereafter, the plaintiffs sought to enforce the 
judgment in the United States, but Chevron opposed this motion on numerous grounds. Id. 
One of the successful defenses involved claiming that the 2011 judgment was procured 
through fraud and corruption and that the American attorneys had acted corruptly as well. 
Id. One such lawyer has, in fact, since been disbarred by the state of New York. Id. Although 
in 2018 the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court affirmed the $9.5 billion award, in September 
of 2018 an international tribunal operated out of the Hague disallowed that judgment, 
holding that the 1998 settlement cleared Chevron and noting that the award granted in 
Ecuador “was procured through fraud, bribery and corruption and was based on claims that 
had been already settled and released by the Republic of Ecuador years earlier.” Id. 
 209. Then there is the issue of judgments from the courts being translated into tangible 
remedies for claimants. While Palkhivala and Dadachanji rightly noted that the Indian 
judiciary (particularly the Supreme Court) has been robust at times in protecting the rights 
of the harmed on paper, an impressive literature has documented how frequently the effects 
of these rulings are neither felt at the community nor the individual level. For studies that 
have discussed this point, see, e.g., ROBERT MOOG, WHOSE INTERESTS ARE SUPREME: 
ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS IN THE CIVIL COURTS IN INDIA 135–46 (1997); Carl Baar, Social 
Action Litigation in India: The Operation and Limitations of the World’s Most Active 
Judiciary, 19 POL’Y STUD. J. 140 (1990); P.N. Bhagwati, Judicial Activism and Public 
Interest Litigation, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 561, 561 (1985); Rajeev Dhavan, Law as 
Struggle: Public Interest Law in India, 36 J. INDIAN L. INST. 302, 305–06 (1994); Galanter 
& Krishnan, supra note 53, at 797; Krishnan & Thomas, supra note 53, at 342; Krishnan 
et al., supra note 53, at 181. Even with respect to the $470 million settlement that the 
Indian Supreme Court approved, there still remain countless victims who have not received 
what they were due. See Alys Francis, Why Are Bhopal Survivors Still Fighting for 
Compensation?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 2, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-
30205140. 
 210. Jayanth K. Krishnan, Professor Kingsfield Goes to Delhi: American Academics, the 
Ford Foundation, and the Development of Legal Education in India, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
447, 468 (2004). 
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economy in 1991—the high prevalence of solo practitioners with limited 
resources and skill sets remains to this day.211 
Yet, none of these points were acknowledged by Palkhivala or 
Dadachanji in their sworn statements. More disheartening was the fact 
that even though the plaintiffs, under the Gilbert and Piper Aircraft 
tests, had sound arguments for why the case ought to be heard in the 
United States, Judge Keenan still opted to rule that the Indian judiciary 
was not just an adequate forum but that it was superior to its American 
counterpart—a curious conclusion, given the mountain of evidence 
pointing in the other direction. 
2.  Other Concerns with the Later MDL Rulings 
Recall that in the 1989 MDL case—where Judge Keenan had 
originally praised the plaintiffs’ lawyers for their good work in trying to 
secure justice for the Bhopal victims—he nevertheless concluded that the 
U.S. courts were “without jurisdiction to award the [lawyers] 
compensation under section 475 of the New York Judiciary Law or any 
other theory.”212 On that same page of his opinion, Judge Keenan also 
quoted the Second Circuit’s judgment affirming his earlier 1986 forum 
non conveniens ruling: 
Once [the district court] dismisses the United States proceedings 
on grounds of forum non conveniens it ceases to have any further 
jurisdiction over the matter unless and until a proceeding may 
some day be brought to enforce here a final and conclusive Indian 
money judgment.213 
How are the final few words of this passage—”to enforce here a final 
and conclusive Indian money judgment”—to be interpreted? On its face, 
enforcement may simply mean ensuring that the plaintiffs receive 
compensation for their suffering. But a logical extension of this point 
would also include that the lawyers be compensated for the work that 
they did on behalf of the plaintiffs. After all, no one—not Judge Keenan, 
the Second Circuit, or the lawyers themselves—had suggested that all of 
this advocacy be done pro bono. Granting this proposition then, it seems 
curious that the judge would not recognize this fact and adhere to the 
spirit of the Second Circuit’s language, which would have permitted the 
 
 211. For a study that has discussed this point, see Krishnan & Thomas, supra note 53, 
at 349–50. 
 212. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, in Dec., 1984, 
MDL No. 626, No. 21–38 (JFK), 1989 WL 66673, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1989). 
 213. Id. (emphasis in original). 
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plaintiffs’ lawyers to collect their fees because of the “final and 
conclusive” nature of the judgment reached between the parties. 
Then, in the related 1993 MDL case, where these lawyers returned 
to Judge Keenan for reconsideration of this matter, his analysis appears 
even more perplexing. This time he criticized the plaintiffs’ lawyers for 
failing to raise their compensation demands in front of the Indian 
courts.214 But as he well knew, the lawyers could not do so because, at 
the time, they were denied visas to enter India.215 He then chastised the 
American lawyers for not hiring local Indian lawyers in a timely fashion 
to make the case on their behalf to the Indian courts.216 However, the 
American lawyers in fact did retain local counsel;217 they were simply 
unsuccessful as the Indian courts held that the lawyers had no standing 
because of the time that had lapsed between the omnibus settlement and 
their petition seeking payment of fees. 
When the case returned to Judge Keenan in 1993, he used this exact 
rationale—that the lawyers’ “efforts to protect their [interests] were too 
little, too late”—as justification for why they could not pursue 
enforcement against Union Carbide in the United States.218 Yet, in 
reality, there was no statute of limitations problem under the New York 
law that they were referencing.219 Seemingly, the conclusion to draw was 
that Judge Keenan was determined not to provide the lawyers with a 
federal forum in which to proceed. 
 
 214. Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster v. Union Carbide Chem. and Plastics Co., 
Nos. M21–38 (JFK), MDL 626, 1993 WL 541230, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 1993). 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. See N.Y. JUD. LAW § 475 (McKinney 2019) (“From the commencement of an action, 
special or other proceeding in any court or before any state, municipal or federal 
department, except a department of labor, or the service of an answer containing a 
counterclaim, or the initiation of any means of alternative dispute resolution including, but 
not limited to, mediation or arbitration, or the provision of services in a settlement 
negotiation at any stage of the dispute, the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon 
his or her client’s cause of action, claim or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, 
determination, decision, award, settlement, judgment or final order in his or her client’s 
favor, and the proceeds thereof in whatever hands they may come;  and the lien cannot be 
affected by any settlement between the parties before or after judgment, final order or 
determination. The court upon the petition of the client or attorney may determine and 
enforce the lien.” (emphasis added)). Indeed, as the statute says and even with the 
settlement reached in India, the lien would have remained intact, contrary to Judge 
Keenan’s assertion that this claim was time-barred. 
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3. Concerns with the Later Non-MDL Cases 
As the above discussion describes, in the Sajida Bano and Sahu 
cases, Judge Keenan heard multiple motions beginning in 2000 that 
spanned the next fifteen years. In not one of these matters did he allow 
the plaintiffs to proceed to trial. It is true that each of his decisions 
withstood appellate scrutiny. The question, however, is whether he was 
willing to take into account all of the facts in these later cases so that he 
could make fully informed judgments. 
Consider one conspicuous instance that highlights this point. In his 
2014 ruling dismissing the plaintiffs’ claims in Sahu II, Judge Keenan 
opted not to allow what he referred to as “late-breaking declarations” 
from key witnesses who stated in sworn affidavits that they could connect 
Union Carbide-U.S. to Union Carbide-India’s plant.220 Such a nexus was 
crucial for the plaintiffs’ argument because it would then allow them to 
assert that the parent company was potentially liable for the actions 
conducted by the subsidiary. In particular, they argued that the Bhopal 
facility—which had been built under American design plans—was 
continuing to pollute the surrounding area well after the 1984 gas leak 
and that it had done little to abate this contamination. The two witnesses 
were Lucas John Couvaras and T.R. Chauhan. Couvaras was a Union 
Carbide-U.S. employee from 1971 through 1981.221 He was charged with 
overseeing “the engineering and construction of the [Union Carbide-
India] plant.”222 Importantly, as Couvaras formally declared: 
The process design reports for the UCIL [i.e., Union Carbide 
India Limited] plant were prepared by [the] UCC [Union Carbide 
Corporation]-Technical Center in Charleston, West Virginia. The 
reports were reviewed and approved by the Managers of the 
various groups who worked on the preparation of these reports 
before they were sent to India.223 
For his part, Chauhan was a resident of Bhopal who worked as a key 
official at the facility where the leak originated.224 He served in this 
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position from 1975 to 1985.225 He confirmed that Couvaras was the 
person in charge of the “detail design and erection of the [Indian] 
plant.”226 Furthermore, he claimed that any site inspections and safety 
oversight were the responsibility of Couvaras. More broadly, Chauhan 
also stated that the technology the Bhopal plant used was always directly 
transferred from the parent company’s offices in the United States.227 
Both these affidavits provided prima facie evidence that a direct link 
existed between Union Carbide-U.S. and Union Carbide-India. Judge 
Keenan, however, did not see it this way. He rejected the idea that 
Couvaras was a Union Carbide-U.S. employee. Rather, Judge Keenan 
found that Couvaras was, for all intents and purposes, exclusively a 
Union Carbide-India official. Couvaras’ role as a plant manager fell 
under the subsidiary’s ambit; in the company’s annual reports, he was 
listed as an employee of the subsidiary and his direct supervisors were 
Indian officials in Mumbai.228 In addition, Judge Keenan disregarded 
Chauhan’s statements. Compared to the declaration by Ranjit Dutta, a 
plant manager at the Bhopal facility who claimed that Couvaras was only 
a Union Carbide-India employee, Chauhan’s affidavit offered “no basis” 
to support the plaintiffs’ contention.229 From there, Judge Keenan then 
disposed of the other submitted causes of action and found that the 
perpetuation of the ongoing contamination could not be anything but the 
responsibility of Indian company officials.230 In fact, he forcefully stated 
(in bolded heading) that: “No Reasonable Juror Could Find for Plaintiffs 
on Any of Their Theories.”231 
And that is where the question lies. Is it true that this case should 
not have proceeded to a jury? For one thing, it was quite remarkable that 
Judge Keenan took the word of a third party (Dutta) on the employment 
status of Couvaras—over Couvaras himself. As one of the lead lawyers 
for the plaintiffs, Marco Simons of EarthRights International bemoaned 
after the ruling, “If you ever thought you knew your own employer’s 
identity, think again—your testimony on that subject isn’t even really 
evidence.”232 The plaintiffs also provided analysis from two renowned 
scientific experts who stated that it was inconceivable that the 
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functioning of the Bhopal plant could have operated independently of 
Union Carbide-U.S. Yet, Judge Keenan also rejected this evidence out-of-
hand. In 2016, the Second Circuit heard the plaintiffs’ appeal. 
Interestingly, the appellate court noted that Couvaras “was lent by UCC 
to UCIL,” but that he was primarily an employee of the Indian facility.233 
The evidentiary connections to the parent company were too tenuous 
and, as such, it did not find that Judge Keenan abused his discretion 
when dismissing the case.234 
However, if the Second Circuit and Judge Keenan could have 
different interpretations on this important issue—which is arguably one 
of a factual nature—should this then not have come under the purview 
of what a jury ought to have heard? If so, perhaps a jury might have found 
that a stronger link indeed existed between Union Carbide-U.S. and 
Union Carbide-India. The point is that, after nearly thirty years of 
Bhopal-based cases coming in front of Judge Keenan, there was little 
doubt as to the way he would rule. For this reason alone, the system of 
how matters are assigned to judges needs to be reconsidered. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article began by referencing Professor Katharine Macfarlane’s 
work on the non-randomized selection process of cases in the federal 
district court of the SDNY.235 As shown by her research, and then 
confirmed by this Bhopal narrative, there is a real question as to whether 
the justice being administered by existing protocol best serves the 
interest of all parties involved—and, more broadly, the interests of 
society at large. 
In various places in her article, Professor Macfarlane notes that 
opposition to the related case’s rule stems from a justifiable concern that 
bias—or even the appearance of it—may set in on the part of the judge.236 
It is important not to allow judges who may have a predisposition 
towards an issue or subject area to decide which cases they are assigned. 
“Drawing an unfavorable judge is fair when it is a matter of luck, and 
nothing more.”237 
Probing this point further, this final Part briefly explores a particular 
area that law and psychology scholars have studied now for some time: 
confirmation bias. A few years back, Eyal Peer and Eyal Gamliel 
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published a useful literature review stating that when “people have a 
preconception or hypothesis about a given issue, they tend to favor 
information that corresponds with their prior beliefs and disregard 
evidence pointing to the contrary.”238 This phenomenon can also include 
judges and their decision-making.239 Their observation is one that 
previous scholars have also noted. Moa Lidén, Minna Gräns, and Peter 
Juslin recently found that judges in Sweden who ordered defendants to 
be held in pre-trial detention facilities were more likely, because of a 
confirmation bias, to subsequently find these defendants guilty.240 
Separately, Eric Rassin, Anita Eerland, and Ilse Kuijpers conducted an 
experimental study that included judges as part of the respondent 
sample. They determined that once an individual is labelled as a primary 
suspect in a criminal case, subsequent evidence that is gathered is 
considered only if it confirms the original viewpoint.241 Otherwise it is 
discarded.242 
In reflecting on this point, one question to ask is whether the thirty 
years of Bhopal rulings by Judge Keenan might be an example of 
confirmation bias.243 Of course, without formal experimentation, it is not 
possible to answer this question with certainty. Still, consider that the 
matters that came before Judge Keenan were not one single case. Rather 
they involved different parties, different issues, and different questions 
of law and fact. Furthermore, the later cases in particular were not 
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related to the MDL, forum non conveniens decision—yet it was that first 
judgment and the reiteration of that rationale that appeared repeatedly 
throughout Judge Keenan’s three decades of rulings. Put another way, 
that initial opinion appears to have strongly shaped Judge Keenan’s 
mindset when it came to: how the tragedy unfolded, where the case 
should be adjudicated, who should be liable, and how evidence should be 
evaluated. 
In terms of this last issue, the different types of evidence that were 
presented by the different claimants in the later cases did not seem to 
make a difference for Judge Keenan. He was unmoved by the subsequent 
legal arguments presented, as he continued to rule that an American 
court could not be a proper venue for claims against Union Carbide. 
Within the scholarly discourse then, Judge Keenan’s behavior might 
seem to comport with those theorists who argue that confirmation bias 
involves the “seeking or interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial 
to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis in hand.”244 
In asserting this point, however, it is crucial not to suggest that 
Judge Keenan may have engaged in this conduct in a purposive fashion. 
Raymond Nickerson, a leading scholar who has studied this subject, 
notes that: 
[C]onfirmation bias connotes a less explicit, less consciously one-
sided case-building process. It refers usually to unwitting 
selectivity in the acquisition and use of evidence. The line 
between deliberate selectivity in the use of evidence and 
unwitting molding of facts to fit hypotheses or beliefs is a difficult 
one to draw in practice, but the distinction is meaningful 
conceptually, and confirmation bias has more to do with the latter 
than with the former. The assumption that people can and do 
engage in case-building unwittingly, without intending to treat 
evidence in a biased way or even being aware of doing so, is 
fundamental to the concept.245 
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If Nickerson is correct that those who demonstrate confirmation bias 
are not doing so in a cognizant fashion, then there is no reason to believe 
that Judge Keenan had an intentional predisposition against the various 
Bhopal-based plaintiffs. Nonetheless, his rulings certainly had a 
pattern—one that negatively affected the different claimants over a three 
decade-period. Moreover, the reputation of a judge having this type of 
tendency also has the possibility of deterring potential claimants from 
pursuing a cause of action for fear that there is no point in doing so. 
Professor Marc Galanter was asked by a law firm in the 2000s whether 
he would be willing to play a similar role in a new case against Union 
Carbide.246 Professor Galanter told the firm that it was futile to try and 
bring such a lawsuit so long as Judge Keenan remained as the presiding 
judge.247 The firm thereafter decided not to proceed and the claimants’ 
case was never filed. 
To close, in order for plaintiffs, particularly those who are in weaker 
positions, to receive a fresh review in federal court, there must be a 
different method in how matters are assigned to judges248—especially 
after an MDL process has come to an end. Drawing on Professor 
Macfarlane’s related cases research, one proposal might be to eliminate 
internal courthouse rules that allow for all judges, including those on 
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senior status, to pre-select cases and instead simply implement a lottery 
system for all assignments.249 Another could be to mandate public 
disclosure of all case assignments to all judges, which would cast sunlight 
on those who might be seeking to hoard certain matters onto their docket 
and, thereby, possibly deter future manipulative behavior.250 And a third 
solution could be to “require . . . [a party] to move for the related case 
designation and . . . [then allow for] the other party . . . to oppose”251 it. 
This last proposal would also require that the matter be handled by a 
different judge than the one who is the focus of the motion.252 
In sum, the hope is that the research here will prompt interested 
observers to reflect on ways to make the MDL and post-MDL processes 
more equitable for future litigants in U.S. federal courts. 
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